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INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of
selected state and federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither
comprehensive in breadth, as several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues
within individual cases are omitted. Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an
authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to alert the Alaska legal community to
judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries are grouped by subject matter.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Alvarez v. State, Department of Administration
In Alvarez v. State, Department of Administration,1 the supreme court held that driver’slicense suspension hearings are not subject to speedy-trial limitations.2 In September of
2003, Alvarez was pulled over and failed a breath test.3 Her license suspension hearing
was delayed until April of 2006.4 The supreme court reasoned that, because a license
suspension hearing is not a criminal proceeding, the policy reasons for speedy-trial
limitations do not apply; thus, the delay did not violate Alvarez’s right to a speedy trial.5
Affirming, the supreme court held that driver’s-license suspension hearings are not
subject to speedy trial limitations.6
Monzulla v. Vorhees Concrete Cutting
In Monzulla v. Vorhees Concrete Cutting,7 the supreme court held that: (1) the Alaska
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission has implied subject matter jurisdiction to
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review interlocutory orders of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board before a final
Board decision and (2) the Commission’s power to issue stays is not confined to
compensation orders.8 Monzulla appealed a grant of venue change by the Commission,
arguing that the legislature had not provided the Commission with authority to review
non-final Board decisions.9 Vorhees contended that the legislature specifically granted
jurisdiction to the Commission to review interlocutory orders.10 After examining
legislative history, persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions, and practical
considerations,11 the supreme court affirmed and held that (1) the Alaska Workers’
Compensation Appeals Commission has implied subject matter jurisdiction to review
interlocutory orders of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board before a final Board
decision and (2) the Commission’s power to issue stays is not confined to compensation
orders.12
Alaska Exchange Carriers Ass’n, Inc. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska
In Alaska Exchange Carriers Ass’n, Inc. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska,13 the
supreme court held that the general prohibition against retroactive ratemaking does not
fully apply to procedural mistakes and that such mistakes may be retroactively corrected
on a case-by-case basis.14 After the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA) closed its
2007 Access Charge Proceedings, the Alaska Exchange Carriers Association (AECA)
discovered an error in the rates it had submitted.15 AECA requested retroactive
application of the corrected rates, but RCA denied the request because of the general
prohibition against retroactive ratemaking.16 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed that
there is a general prohibition against retroactive ratemaking.17 But the court reasoned that
there might be a sound justification for retroactive ratemaking in procedural mistake
cases and that each such case should be evaluated individually by the RCA.18 The court
thus recognized the correction of procedural mistakes as distinct from retroactive
ratemaking.19 Reversing, the supreme court held that the general prohibition against
retroactive ratemaking does not fully apply to procedural mistakes and that such mistakes
may be retroactively corrected on a case-by-case basis.20
Shea v. State, Department of Administration
In Shea v. State, Department of Administration,21 the supreme court held that, with regard
to occupational disability benefits, an applicant must prove only that an occupational
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injury was “a” (not “the”) substantial factor leading to the disability. 22 An administrative
law judge determined that Shea’s prolonged sitting at work was one among many factors
contributing to her disability, not the substantial factor that caused her disability.23
Because, by statute, Shea was required to prove that her occupational injury was a
“substantial factor” in her disability, she was denied occupational disability benefits.24
The superior court affirmed.25 On appeal, Shea argued that AS 39.35.680(27), requiring
that an occupational injury be a “substantial factor” in the disability, does not require the
occupational injury to be “the” substantial factor leading to the disability. 26 The supreme
court reasoned that, with respect to torts and to workers’ compensation claims, it had
previously held that “substantial factor” meant only “a” substantial factor or legal cause
of injury, not “the” substantial factor or legal cause.27 Importing this same analysis into
the occupational disability arena, the court noted that, although an applicant need only
show that the worker’s injury was “a” substantial factor, the applicant must also show
that the disability was actually and proximately caused by the injury. 28 Reversing, the
supreme court held that, with regard to occupational disability benefits, an applicant must
prove only that an occupational injury was “a” (not “the”) substantial factor leading to the
disability.29
Widmyer v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
In Widmyer v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,30 the supreme court held
that the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) does not abuse its discretion by
refusing to consider new evidence in a petition for reconsideration when the petitioner
has had numerous opportunities to present evidence.31 To gain entry to certain fisheries,
applicants were required by the CFEC to present evidence that they had in years past
obtained a requisite amount of fish from those fisheries; alternatively, documented
extraordinary circumstances preventing them from obtaining the requisite amount of fish
could suffice to obtain a permit.32 Widmyer applied for entry, claiming that extraordinary
circumstances had prevented him from obtaining the requisite amount of fish ordinarily
required for entry.33 The CFEC denied his application.34 Twenty years later, Widmyer
petitioned for reconsideration, attaching new affidavits and other new evidence to his
petition, but the CFEC refused to allow any additions to his record.35 On appeal,
Widmyer argued that the CFEC had abused its discretion by refusing to consider new
evidence in his petition for reconsideration.36 The supreme court noted that the CFEC had
22
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been given the power to regulate its own procedures and that nothing in the Limited
Entry Act requires the CFEC to consider new evidence (or prevents it from doing so).37
The court further noted that Widmyer had had over 20 years to collect and present
evidence and that he had been afforded numerous opportunities to present evidence.38
The supreme court therefore affirmed, holding that the CFEC does not abuse its
discretion by refusing to consider new evidence in a petition for reconsideration when the
petitioner has had numerous opportunities to present evidence.39
J.P. v. Anchorage School District
In J.P. v. Anchorage School District,40 the supreme court held that a school district’s
delay in evaluating a student for special education services does not render the district
responsible for the costs of that student’s elective private tutoring. 41 The parents of an
elementary school student became concerned about their son’s reading skills and
requested that the school evaluate him for special education services. 42 When the school
district failed to act, they reiterated their request and asked for a hearing under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).43 They then had an evaluation
conducted by a private practitioner and sought tutoring for their son. 44 A hearing officer
agreed with the school district that the child was ineligible for special education services,
but the officer required the school district to reimburse his parents for half the cost of his
tutoring.45 The superior court held that the school district was not responsible for the
costs of tutoring since the child had been found to be ineligible for tutoring services
under IDEA.46 On appeal, the parents argued that the school district’s delay in conducting
an evaluation should permit them to seek reimbursement for the tutoring service. 47 The
supreme court disagreed with the parents, reasoning that procedural violations under
IDEA should not render a school district responsible for services it would not have been
required to provide.48 Affirming, the supreme court held that a school district’s delay in
evaluating a student for special education services does not render the district responsible
for the costs of that student’s elective private tutoring.49
Alaskan Crude Corp. v. State, Department of Natural Resources
In Alaskan Crude Corp. v. State, Department of Natural Resources,50 the supreme court
held that a pending appeal does not constitute a “force majeure” for the purposes of
releasing a unit operator from the terms of a unit agreement for oil and gas exploration if
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the unit operator was aware of the appeal at the time the unit agreement was made.51
Alaskan Crude operated an oil and gas well.52 It had formed a unit agreement with the
State Department of Natural Resources (DNR) setting forth deadlines for certain work
obligations and providing that the violation of those deadlines would constitute a default
of the agreement.53 Alaskan Crude received notice that the Alaska Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission (AOGCC) had designated the well gas only; Alaskan Crude
modified the deadlines in its unit agreement while simultaneously appealing AOGCC’s
decision.54 When Alaskan Crude failed to meet the modified deadlines, it argued that the
pending appeal of AOGCC’s decision was a “force majeure” which, under the terms of
the unit agreement, released it from the obligation of meeting the deadlines.55 The trial
court held that the pending appeal was not a “force majeure.”56 The supreme court
agreed, noting that Alaskan Crude had notice of AOGCC’s decision and the pending
appeal at the time that its unit agreement was modified; therefore, the appeal was not
beyond Alaskan Crude’s ability to foresee or control (as required by DNR’s definition of
“force majeure”).57 Affirming, the supreme court held that a pending appeal does not
constitute a “force majeure” for the purposes of releasing a unit operator from the terms
of a unit agreement for oil and gas exploration if the unit operator was aware of the
appeal at the time the unit agreement was modified.58
Lewis-Walunga v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Lewis-Walunga v. Municipality of Anchorage,59 the supreme court held that a
“successful party” in an appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission is a
party that prevails on a significant issue in the appeal.60 Lewis-Walunga won a workers’
compensation claim and was awarded attorneys’ fees, but the Workers’ Compensation
Board awarded 30 percent less in attorneys’ fees than Lewis-Walunga had requested.61
She appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, and, although the
Commission did not agree with all of her points of appeal, it did agree to vacate the
award and remanded to the Board for a factual finding that would justify the reduced
award.62 When Lewis-Walunga moved for attorneys’ fees for the appeal, the Commission
held that she had not been the “successful party” on appeal because she had not received
an award of full attorneys’ fees.63 On appeal from the Commission’s decision, the
supreme court determined that the attorneys’ fees award provision in AS 23.30.008(d)
(which governs awards for Commission appeals) should be construed similarly to
Appellate Rule 508(g)(2), which contains similar language. 64 The court determined that a
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“successful party” in a Commission appeal is a party that prevails on a significant issue in
the appeal.65 Because one of the remedies requested by Lewis-Walunga from the
Commission was a remand for additional fact-finding, Lewis-Walunga was a “successful
party” under the attorneys’ fees provision.66 Reversing, the supreme court held that a
“successful party” in an appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission is a
party that prevails on a significant issue in the appeal.67
Marathon Oil Co. v. State, Department of Natural Resources
In Marathon Oil Co. v. State, Department of Natural Resources,68 the supreme court held
that it will defer to agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute when the agency’s
interpretation is long-standing.69 By statute, royalties from natural gas production on land
leased from the State can be calculated in two ways: “higher of” pricing or contract
pricing.70 “Higher of” pricing is the default.71 Marathon had been paying royalties under
the default option for five years; it then requested that the State apply contract pricing
retroactively to its royalty calculations for the previous five years. 72 The Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) refused, determining that the applicable statute,
AS 38.05.180(aa), does not authorize DNR to grant retroactive approval of a change in
the method of royalty calculation; DNR determined that it could only approve a change in
method for future production.73 On appeal, Marathon argued that the statute does give
DNR the authority to grant retroactive approval for past production.74 The supreme court
first determined that the statute is ambiguous and that the legislative history did not
resolve the ambiguity.75 But the court noted that DNR had interpreted the ambiguous
statute, for at least ten years, to prevent retroactive approval of the kind that Marathon
requested.76 Because the interpretation was long-standing, the court deferred to DNR’s
interpretation.77 Affirming, the supreme court held that it will defer to agency
interpretation of an ambiguous statute when the agency’s interpretation is longstanding.78
Rivera v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
In Rivera v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,79 the supreme court held that the state’s Workers’
Compensation Board does not err in denying a claim when it assigns greater weight to the
testimony of one of several medical experts.80 Rivera injured her back on two occasions
65
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while employed by Wal-Mart and she was paid workers’ compensation benefits.81 The
store filed a controversion after its doctor examined Rivera and concluded that her
ongoing back pain was caused by an underlying degenerative condition and not by the
injuries she had received in the course of her employment.82 Rivera filed for temporary
total disability benefits, citing the opinion of several other doctors that the injuries had
exacerbated her degenerative condition and were the cause of her back pain. 83 The
Workers’ Compensation Board denied her claim for benefits based on the testimony of
Wal-Mart’s doctor, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the
Board’s decision.84 On appeal, the supreme court cited existing case law suggesting that
the Board can assign unequal credence to conflicting testimony of medical experts in
reaching its decision so long as it weighs all testimony and identifies which opinion it
considers more persuasive.85The supreme court affirmed, holding that the Workers’
Compensation Board does not err in denying a claim when it assigns greater weight to the
testimony of one of several medical experts.86
State, Department of Corrections v. Hendricks-Pearce
In State, Department of Corrections v. Hendricks-Pearce,87 the supreme court held that,
under AS 33.30.028, a former prisoner can be liable to the State for the cost of medical
care that he received while he was a prisoner.88 While incarcerated, Pearce received
medical care at the State’s expense.89 He obtained a medical malpractice award for the
care that he had received and the Department of Corrections (DOC) withheld from that
award the amount that it claimed the DOC had spent on his medical care.90 In a
declaratory judgment action filed by DOC after Pearce had been released, the superior
court granted Pearce’s motion for summary judgment, holding that AS 33.30.028, which
states that medical care costs are the responsibility of the prisoner, does not apply to
former prisoners.91 On appeal, the supreme court noted that, although the statute is
applicable to “prisoner[s],” statutes often identify parties based on a prior status.92 The
court also noted that applying the statute to former prisoners would further the
legislature’s goal of curbing prison costs.93 Finally, the court reasoned that a narrower
interpretation would lead to anomalous results because it would condition the State’s
right to reimbursement on the timing of medical care.94 Reversing, the supreme court
held that, under AS 33.30.028, a former prisoner can be liable to the State for the cost of
medical care that he received while he was a prisoner.95
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James v. State, Department of Corrections
In James v. State, Department of Corrections,96 the supreme court held that
(1) disciplinary proceedings for alleged “low-moderate” infractions by a prisoner can,
when the charges are serious enough and when the punishment is severe enough,
constitute a “major disciplinary proceeding” entitling the inmate to due process rights
(including the right to produce documentary evidence, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, and the right to have the disciplinary hearing recorded);97 and (2) the
24-hour written-notice requirement, which applies when the inmate desires to call
witnesses at the disciplinary hearing, does not apply to a request for the presence of the
inmate’s accusers.98 The superior court upheld James’ disciplinary adjudication, which
had resulted in a punishment of 20 days of solitary confinement, because James had not
given written notice in advance of the disciplinary hearing that he desired to confront his
accuser.99 James appealed the decision, arguing that his due process rights had been
violated because the adjudication was entirely based on hearsay information and because
the hearing had not been audio recorded.100 After examining court precedent and state
regulations,101 the supreme court reversed.102 It held that (1) disciplinary proceedings for
alleged “low-moderate” infractions by a prisoner can, when the charges are serious
enough and when the punishment is severe enough, constitute a “major disciplinary
proceeding” entitling the inmate to expanded due process rights (including the right to
produce documentary evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and
the right to have the disciplinary hearing recorded);103 and (2) the 24-hour written-notice
requirement, which applies when the inmate desires to call witnesses at the disciplinary
hearing, does not apply to a request for the presence of the inmate’s accusers.104
BUSINESS LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp.
In Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp.,105 the supreme court held that the business
judgment rule does not necessitate finding that a corporate director acted with gross
negligence before imposing liability on the director.106 A jury found Henrichs liable for
breaching his fiduciary duty to Chugach Alaska Corporation under an ordinary
negligence standard of care.107 Separately, the superior court determined that Henrichs
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had abused his authority.108 On appeal, Henrichs argued that the business judgment rule
protects directors from liability unless their conduct is determined to be grossly negligent
and that, therefore, the superior court had erred by instructing the jury that he could be
liable for breaching his fiduciary duties under an ordinary negligence standard of care.109
The supreme court noted that, although the common law business judgment rule protects
corporate directors from liability absent a showing of bad faith, a breach of fiduciary
duty, or an act contrary to public policy, the court had never adopted a “gross negligence”
standard and refused to do so for Henrichs.110 The court reasoned that because the jury
had found that Henrichs breached his fiduciary duty, and because the superior court had
found that Henrichs had abused his authority, the business judgment rule did not protect
Henrichs from liability.111 Affirming, the supreme court held that the business judgment
rule does not necessitate finding that a corporate director acted with gross negligence
before imposing liability on the director.112
Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp.
In Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp.,113 the supreme court held that a corporation does
not have an affirmative duty to deliver books, records, or documents to shareholders or
directors.114 Three former directors of Chugach Alaska Corporation each sought
reelection to the corporation’s board of directors.115 They requested a list of shareholder
addresses and the number of shares owned by each shareholder. 116 Chugach sent the
former directors an email containing that information, but did not send it as quickly as the
directors wanted.117 The former directors sued the corporation, claiming that the
corporation had a duty to deliver the requested information to them.118 The superior court
granted summary judgment to the corporation because the former directors had not
sought to inspect the shareholder list at the corporation’s registered office or principal
place of business.119 On appeal, the supreme court determined that state law provides
directors the right to inspect and copy books, records, and documents, but it does not
provide directors with the right to have books, records, or documents personally delivered
to them.120 Affirming, the supreme court held that a corporation does not have an
affirmative duty to deliver books, records, or documents to shareholders or directors.121
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Roberson v. Southwood Manor Associates, LLC
In Roberson v. Southwood Manor Associates, LLC,122 the supreme court held that
Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA) does not apply to
real property transactions.123 Southwood Manor owned a trailer park in Anchorage,
where Roberson rented space.124 When Roberson was late with rent payments,
Southwood sued, seeking late charges.125 Roberson filed a counterclaim, arguing that the
late charges violated the UTPA.126 The superior court held that the UTPA did not apply
to residential leases.127 On appeal, the supreme court noted that, although the UTPA’s list
of unfair trade practices is not exhaustive, disputes between landlords and tenants were
not listed in the UTPA, and the court further noted that it had never previously held that
the UTPA applied to transactions involving real property.128 Affirming, the supreme
court held that the UTPA does not apply to real property transactions.129
ASRC Energy Services Power & Communications, LLC v. Golden Valley Electric
Ass’n, Inc.
In ASRC Energy Services Power & Communications, LLC v. Golden Valley Electric
Ass’n, Inc.,130 the supreme court held that the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act’s (UTPA) directive that, when interpreting the UTPA, courts
give due consideration and great weight to the FTC Act and its interpretations, does not
require a court to abandon Alaskan precedent when the FTC Act later changes. 131 Golden
awarded ASRC two construction bids.132 A contract dispute arose due to ASRC’s
requesting additional compensation.133 During the trial, both parties amended their
pleadings and answers to include UTPA claims and counterclaims.134 The UTPA directs
courts to give due consideration and great weight to the FTC Act and its interpretations
when interpreting the UTPA.135 The supreme court relied on the FTC Act interpretations
when defining the UTPA’s standards.136 Congress later amended the FTC Act, including
the portions that the supreme court had previously relied upon to determine the scope of
the UTPA.137 On appeal, ASRC claimed that using the previous Alaska standard would
violate the UTPA’s directive to give due consideration and great weight to the FTC Act
and its interpretations.138 The supreme court reasoned that the state legislature that had
passed the UTPA had referred to the FTC Act that existed at that time, and that the
122
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legislature had not intended that the courts would abandon state precedent if the federal
law later changed.139 The supreme court held that the UTPA directive that, when
interpreting the UTPA, courts give due consideration and great weight to the FTC Act
and its interpretations, does not require a court to abandon Alaskan precedent when the
FTC Act later changes.140
CIVIL PROCEDURE
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Miller v. Handle Construction Co.
In Miller v. Handle Construction Co.,141 the supreme court held that the offeror in a
Rule 68 settlement agreement is entitled to offset the settlement amount by any other
amount collected by the offeree that rightfully belongs to the offeror. 142 Miller bought a
pre-fabricated building from VP Buildings (VP); he then contracted with Handle
Construction Company (Handle) to assemble the building.143 Handle incurred more costs
than it expected due to design defects caused by VP. 144 Miller authorized Handle to
negotiate with VP to recover its costs without assigning his contractual rights to
Handle.145 Handle then sued Miller for the extra costs and Miller made a Rule 68
settlement offer.146 Handle accepted Miller’s offer and simultaneously accepted a
settlement offer from VP.147 Miller argued that the settlement offer amount should have
been offset by the amount that Handle had collected from VP, but the superior court
rejected his argument because the settlement offer had not explicitly allowed for an offset
if Handle recovered from VP.148 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that every
Rule 68 settlement offer implies that the offeror will give up a specific amount of money
in exchange for certainty that the specified amount is the only money he will lose with
respect to those claims.149 Therefore, if the money was rightfully Miller’s, then he should
have been entitled to an offset.150 Reversing, the supreme court held that the offeror in a
Rule 68 settlement agreement is entitled to offset the settlement amount by any other
amount collected by the offeree that rightfully belongs to the offeror.151
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Stevens v. State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Board
In Stevens v. State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Board,152 the supreme court held that,
when a municipality’s subordinate improperly exercises the power of the municipality,
the procedural defect can be remedied by the municipality’s endorsement and adoption of
the subordinate’s action.153 Stevens owned a bar that violated its Borough’s noise
ordinance.154 The Borough’s Director of Planning and Land Use (Director) protested the
bar’s liquor license before the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC) and the
Borough’s attorneys advocated the Director’s position.155 ABC revoked the bar’s liquor
license and the superior court affirmed the revocation.156 On appeal, Stevens argued that
the Borough, not its employee, should have been required to file the protest or to
officially delegate its powers to protest to the Director.157 The supreme court first noted
that, under the municipal statute, it appeared that the Director did have authority to file a
protest.158 But the court also noted that the Borough’s attorneys had litigated the
Director’s position at every step of the way.159 The court reasoned that, even if there had
been some procedural irregularity, the Borough’s endorsement of the Director’s action
cured any possible procedural defect.160 The supreme court held that, when a
municipality’s subordinate improperly exercises the power of the municipality, the
procedural defect can be remedied by the municipality’s endorsement and adoption of the
subordinate’s action.161
Kalenka v. Infinity Insurance Co.
In Kalenka v. Infinity Insurance Co.,162 the supreme court held that, although an injured
party usually is allowed to choose its forum for litigation, the injured party waives that
right by filing a counterclaim against an insurance company that is seeking a declaration
that its policy does not cover the injured party.163 Kalenka’s car was rear-ended.164 The
driver of the other vehicle became enraged and stabbed Kalenka, killing him.165 Infinity
sought a declaratory judgment that it did not owe payments to Kalenka’s estate.166
Kalenka’s estate filed a counterclaim for money allegedly owed under Kalenka’s
insurance policy.167 The superior court did not completely dispose of the claims until
after Kalenka’s estate had obtained a judgment against the owner of the vehicle that had
rear-ended Kalenka’s car, over four years later.168 The superior court then held that
152
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Kalenka’s insurance policy did not cover the circumstances surrounding Kalenka’s
death.169 On appeal, Kalenka’s estate argued that the superior court should not have
entered judgment for Infinity because there were still material factual issues related to the
underlying tort claims.170 The supreme court noted that, generally, an injured party is
allowed to choose the forum in which to litigate a tort claim.171 It also noted that an
insurer’s interest in obtaining a declaratory judgment should not displace the injured
party’s right to choose its own forum.172 Here, however, Infinity had initiated the
declaratory judgment action to determine a very limited question; it was Kalenka’s estate
that had chosen to litigate the underlying tort claims by filing a counterclaim.173 Further,
the court had waited to dispose of the claims until Kalenka’s estate had litigated the
underlying tort claims.174 Affirming, the supreme court held that, although an injured
party usually is allowed to choose its forum for litigation, the injured party waives that
right by filing a counterclaim against an insurance company that is seeking a declaration
that its policy does not cover the injured party.175
In re Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault
In In re Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault,176 the supreme court
held that the Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault (ANDVSA)
constitutes a public agency, therefore requiring the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) to
provide representation to an indigent party in a child custody dispute in which the other
party is represented by ANDVSA.177 A mother was represented by ANDVSA in a child
custody dispute and the superior court appointed counsel from OPA for the indigent
father.178 OPA sought to withdraw its representation and appealed, arguing that
ANDVSA did not qualify as a public agency because it was funded by discretionary
grants, because it was not a creature of any legislature, and because its Board of Directors
was not appointed by any member of the Alaska or federal executive branch. 179 The
supreme court had previously limited the constitutional right to counsel in custody cases
to situations where an indigent party’s opponent was represented by counsel provided by
a public agency.180 The supreme court concluded that a public agency is an organization
supported in large part by public funding sources, even if it is a private corporation; thus,
ANDVSA qualified as a public agency because it received over 99 percent of its funding
from federal and state government sources.181 Affirming, the supreme court held that
ANDVSA constitutes a public agency, therefore requiring OPA to provide representation

169

Id. at 606.
Id. at 612.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 613.
175
Id. at 612–13.
176
264 P.3d 835 (Alaska 2011).
177
Id. at 836.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 836–37.
180
Id. at 837.
181
Id. at 838–39.
170

13

to an indigent party in a child custody dispute in which the other party is represented by
ANDVSA.182
Griswold v. City of Homer
In Griswold v. City of Homer,183 the supreme court held that an individual does not have
standing to appeal the grant of a land-use permit when the permit will not adversely
affect the use, enjoyment, or value of his personal property.184 Griswold appealed the
grant of a conditional-use permit that he believed would create congestion and a visual
blight on a public beach that he frequented.185 The city clerk denied his appeal for lack of
standing because his interest in the property was no different from that of the general
public.186 On appeal, Griswold argued that the standing requirement violated equal
protection by discriminating against him as a litigant.187 The supreme court rejected this
contention because there was a legitimate reason for disparate treatment: limiting
standing to individuals with a substantial, direct and immediate interest in the outcome of
the litigation prevents excessive litigation and undue delay of a final disposition.188 The
supreme court also concluded that the standing requirement bore a fair and substantial
relationship to that legitimate reason and thus did not violate Griswold’s due process
rights.189 The supreme court dismissed Griswold’s appeal, holding that an individual does
not have standing to appeal the grant of a land-use permit when the permit will not
adversely affect the use, enjoyment, or value of his personal property.190
Trask v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough
In Trask v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough,191 the supreme court held that an individual has
standing to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a municipality files a civil
complaint that actually and prospectively violates her First Amendment rights.192 Trask, a
resident of the Ketchikan Gateway Borough, painted a religious message on her roof after
receiving approval from the Borough that the message would not require a permit.193 The
Borough subsequently sent Trask letters stating that the message violated the Borough’s
code, threatened citations if she failed to remove the message, sought to enjoin her from
displaying the message, and sought to fine her.194 Trask brought a § 1983 claim, but the
superior court dismissed it after concluding that Trask lacked standing to litigate the
constitutionality of the ordinance.195 On appeal, the supreme court noted that standing in
Alaska is interpreted leniently.196 Thus, an individual with an identifiable trifle has
182

Id. at 836.
252 P.3d 1020 (Alaska 2011).
184
Id. at 1031–32.
185
Id. at 1024.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 1030–31.
188
Id. at 1031.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 1031–32.
191
253 P.3d 616 (Alaska 2011).
192
Id. at 620.
193
Id. at 617–18.
194
Id. at 618.
195
Id. at 619.
196
Id.
183

14

standing to litigate.197 The court reasoned that Trask’s injuries surpassed the level of
trifling, because the Borough had ordered removal of the message, threatened Trask with
citations, and filed a complaint against her.198 Moreover, because of the enforcement
actions, Trask alleged that she had chosen not to modify the message.199 Reversing, the
supreme court held that an individual has standing under § 1983 if a municipality files a
civil complaint that violates the individual’s actual and prospective First Amendment
rights.200
Taylor v. Moutrie-Pelham
In Taylor v. Moutrie-Pelham,201 the supreme court held that a trial court does not abuse
its discretion by refraining from characterizing either party as the prevailing party if both
parties prevail on a main issue of the action.202 Taylor alleged that Moutrie-Pelham had
converted $30,000 of Taylor’s funds and breached a lease agreement.203 Moutrie-Pelham
counterclaimed that Taylor had breached the lease agreement and owed $7,000 in unpaid
rent.204 Taylor did not contest the unpaid rent portion of the breach claim.205 The trial
court awarded $23,000 to Taylor on the conversion claim but awarded Moutrie-Pelham
$10,574 on the breach claim and ruled that neither party had prevailed for the purpose of
an attorneys’ fees award.206 The supreme court reasoned that the trial court’s prevailing
party determination was not arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or improperly
motivated because the breach claim had been a main issue in the case.207 Both parties had
alleged breach of contract.208 Moutrie-Pelham had been awarded nearly half the amount
that was awarded to Taylor.209 That the counterclaim had gone uncontested was irrelevant
because Moutrie-Pelham had obtained the relief sought in the counterclaim.210 The
supreme court affirmed, holding that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by
refraining from characterizing either party as the prevailing party if both parties prevail
on a main issue of the action.211
Chilkoot Lumber Co., Inc. v. Rainbow Glacier Seafoods, Inc.
In Chilkoot Lumber Co., Inc. v. Rainbow Glacier Seafoods, Inc.,212 the supreme court
held that a settlement agreement made orally in court is enforceable even if the agreement
is not later written down.213 Rainbow leased property and a dock from Chilkoot to use for
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Rainbow’s fish-processing equipment.214 Chilkoot later sued Rainbow for unpaid rent.215
Both parties agreed to a settlement, orally confirmed the agreement in superior court, and
agreed to put the agreement in writing.216 But when the agreement was reduced to
writing, Rainbow refused to sign.217 Rainbow subsequently failed to adhere to the terms
of the agreement.218 Chilkoot moved to enforce the agreement, but the superior court
denied its motion because no written agreement had been signed by Rainbow.219 On
appeal, the supreme court reasoned that the original agreement was enforceable, even
though it was not written, because an oral agreement made on the record in court is
recognized as binding under both the Civil Rules and case law. 220 As long as both parties
state on the record that they intend to be bound by an agreement, a settlement agreement
is enforceable.221 Reversing, the supreme court held that a settlement agreement made
orally in court is enforceable even if the agreement is not later written down.222
Kingery v. Barrett
In Kingery v. Barrett,223 the supreme court held that, if a litigant moves for a new trial by
arguing that the jury’s verdict went against the weight of the evidence, it is not reversible
error for the superior court to deny the motion when conflicting evidence was presented
at trial.224 Kingery and Barrett had a car accident; while Kingery was still in his car, a
third car struck his vehicle.225 A year later, Kingery injured his back while operating a
bulldozer.226 Then, two years after the car accident, Kingery sued Barrett for injuries that
he had suffered in the accident.227 At trial, Kingery testified that he had not felt like he
had been injured after the first collision, and his doctors could not say that the collision
with Barrett had caused Kingery’s pain and back damage.228 A jury determined that
Barrett’s negligence had not been a legal cause of Kingery’s injuries.229 On appeal,
Kingery argued that he should have been entitled to a new trial because the jury verdict
had gone against the weight of the evidence.230 The supreme court noted that, although
Kingery’s injury and Barrett’s negligence had been undisputed, the evidence had not
established that Barrett’s negligence caused Kingery’s injury.231 Because the evidence
about causation conflicted, the supreme court would not reverse the superior court’s
denial of a motion for a new trial.232 The supreme court held that, if a litigant moves for a
214
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new trial by arguing that the jury’s verdict went against the weight of the evidence, it is
not reversible error for the superior court to deny the motion when conflicting evidence
was presented at trial.233
3-D & Co. v. Tew’s Excavating, Inc.
In 3-D & Co. v. Tew’s Excavating, Inc.,234 the supreme court held that a court’s request
for supplemental briefing does not constitute an abuse of discretion when the request is
sufficiently related to the substantive issues in dispute.235 3-D appealed a superior court’s
determination that, although it had proven a breach of contract by Tew, 3-D had failed to
prove damages to any degree of certainty and had failed to provide Tew with a
reasonable opportunity to cure.236 3-D argued, in part, that the lower court had abused its
discretion by requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on whether 3-D had a
duty to give Tew notice and an opportunity to cure.237 The supreme court explained that
Alaska courts have inherent discretionary authority to decide a case on a legal theory not
presented by the parties, but advised that they should use this discretion sparingly.238
Courts may consider new theories when the new theory applies to the transaction at issue,
is related to the theories presented by the parties, and is necessary for a proper and just
disposition of the case.239 Because the issues of notice and cure were tied to 3-D’s theory
of the case, the supreme court affirmed and held that a court’s request for supplemental
briefing does not constitute an abuse of discretion when the request is sufficiently related
to the substantive issues in dispute.240
Azimi v. Johns
In Azimi v. Johns,241 the supreme court held that it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss a
complaint with prejudice when a pro se litigant fails to fully comply with court orders
due to medical concerns and confusion regarding what is required of him.242 Azimi and
Johns were in a car accident, and Azimi filed a pro se complaint claiming that the
accident had caused him physical injury and psychological problems.243 Azimi did not
fully comply with the lower court’s pretrial order to provide exhibits and jury
instructions, expressing confusion over the required materials and concern that
complying with the order would affect his health.244 Johns moved to dismiss, arguing that
Azimi’s failure to comply with the court’s pretrial order warranted involuntary
dismissal.245 The lower court dismissed Azimi’s suit, and Azimi appealed.246 The
supreme court reasoned that Azimi’s failure to present jury instructions and fully comply
233
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with pre-trial orders had not amounted to willful noncompliance with the court order.247
The court noted that Azimi had ultimately complied with most requests, and his mere
failure to submit jury instructions had not warranted an involuntary dismissal.248 The
supreme court held that it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss a complaint with prejudice
when a pro se litigant fails to fully comply with court orders due to medical concerns and
confusion regarding what is required of him.249
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Vandevere v. Lloyd
In Vandevere v. Lloyd,250 the Ninth Circuit held that lessees contractually waive their
right to challenge state regulations as unconstitutional takings when their leases contain a
waiver provision.251 Fishermen who held fishery leases sued the Alaska Commissioner of
Fisheries when new regulations reduced the value of their leases; the fishermen argued
that the regulations amounted to an unconstitutional taking.252 The district court held that
the fishermen had waived any right to compensation by entering lease agreements that
contained a provision permitting the State to create new regulations that might affect the
value of the leases.253 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit explained that the fishermen had to
show they had a property interest in the leases; if the fishermen did have a property
interest, they would have to show that the State’s expropriation of that interest amounted
to a Fifth Amendment taking.254 The court then noted that property rights are creatures of
state law and that, in the case of “new property” rights like the fishery leases, the state
determines what interests an individual possesses.255 Here, the fishermen’s lease
agreements explicitly stated that the leases would not limit the power of the State to adopt
regulations affecting the value of the interest under the leases. 256 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the Takings Clause only prohibits uncompensated takings, that
compensation can be contractually waived, and that the lease agreements contained such
a contractual waiver.257 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that lessees contractually
waive their right to challenge state regulations as unconstitutional takings when their
leases contain a waiver provision.258
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United States District Court for the District of Alaska
American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression v. Sullivan
In American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression v. Sullivan,259 the federal
district court held that a statute criminalizing the knowing distribution of indecent
materials to minors via the internet is unconstitutional if it is not narrowly tailored to
avoid burdening the First Amendment rights of adults.260 Booksellers, libraries, and
publishers alleged that AS 11.61.128, which criminalized the knowing distribution of
indecent material to minors via the internet, violated the First Amendment.261 Applying
strict scrutiny because the statute restricted speech based on the speech’s content, the
court reasoned that “knowing distribution” is not the same as “knowing distribution to a
person whom the distributor knows or should know is a minor.”262 The statute thus would
have criminalized distribution even if the distributor did not know that the recipient was a
minor.263 This would have a chilling effect on adults’ First Amendment rights because
there are no reasonable technological means to ascertain the actual age of an individual
on the internet.264 For this reason, the court determined that the statute had not been
narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose.265 The federal district court held that a statute
criminalizing the knowing distribution of indecent materials to minors via the internet is
unconstitutional if it is not narrowly tailored to avoid burdening the First Amendment
rights of adults.266
Alaska Supreme Court
Pfeifer v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Pfeifer v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,267 the supreme court held
that a retroactive statute reducing Medicaid eligibility does not amount to an
unconstitutional taking.268 Pfeifer met with a lawyer to discuss estate planning.269 She
intended to give her son money in February 2007, but wanted to ensure that the gift
would not prevent her from receiving Medicaid if she lived long enough to exhaust her
assets.270 At the time of the gift, state Medicaid law provided that the penalty period for
such asset transfers would begin immediately after the gift was given.271 But in 2008, the
state legislature changed the penalty period so that it would begin running only after all
of the Medicaid recipient’s assets were used up.272 The legislature gave the new law

259

799 F.Supp.2d 1078 (D. Alaska 2011).
Id. at 1086–87.
261
Id. at 1078–79.
262
Id. at 1081–82.
263
Id. at 1082.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 1082–83.
266
Id. at 1086–87.
267
260 P.3d 1072 (Alaska 2011).
268
Id. at 1081.
269
Id. at 1076.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 1075.
260

19

retroactive effect to October 2006, before Pfeifer made her gift.273 Pfeifer’s son appealed
the decision, but the administrative agency and the superior court upheld the validity of
the penalty provision’s retroactive application.274 In the supreme court, he argued that the
statute’s retroactive application amounted to an unconstitutional taking under the U.S.
and Alaska Constitutions.275 The court stated that, in any takings analysis, the first
consideration is whether the claimant has a protected property interest.276 The court
reasoned that a future Medicaid benefit is not a property interest that has yet vested, and,
at the time of her gift, Pfeifer had nothing more than an inchoate expectancy of
eventually becoming eligible for the benefits.277 Thus, the supreme court held that a
retroactive statute reducing Medicaid eligibility does not amount to an unconstitutional
taking.278
In re Tracy C.
In In re Tracy C.,279 the supreme court held that, although a patient may be involuntarily
committed only if she is gravely disabled at the time of her commitment hearing, a judge
can consider the patient’s recent behavior, condition, and symptoms when making that
determination.280 At her involuntary commitment hearing, Tracy’s doctor testified that
although Tracy had improved since beginning treatment a few days before, she was still
in an acute manic state and could relapse at any time without her medication.281 Based
on this testimony, the probate master found her gravely disabled and recommended that
the commitment petition be granted.282 On appeal, Tracy argued that the superior court
had improperly based its commitment order on the symptoms she displayed at the time of
admission when it should have based its decision on her condition at the time of the
commitment hearing.283 The supreme court agreed that a commitment order must be
based on a patient’s condition at the time of the hearing, but it concluded that recent
behaviors and symptoms are also appropriate for the court to consider in ordering
commitment.284 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s order for
involuntary commitment and held that while a patient may be involuntarily committed
only if she is gravely disabled at the time of her commitment hearing, a judge can
consider the patient’s recent behavior, condition, and symptoms when making that
determination.285
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CONTRACT LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
O’Connell v. Will
In O’Connell v. Will,286 the supreme court held that a contractual provision requiring that
a party pay attorneys’ fees in any lawsuit concerning the contract also requires the party
to pay attorneys’ fees for costs incurred to collect on a judgment.287 A note contract
between O’Connell and Will stated that, if a lawsuit was necessary to collect the note, a
“reasonable attorney’s fee in such suit or action” would likewise be collected. 288 When
O’Connell sued Will to collect on the note, the superior court awarded attorneys’ fees for
the fees incurred to obtain a judgment but held that, based on the contract, O’Connell was
not entitled to attorneys’ fees for the fees incurred to collect on the judgment.289 On
appeal, the supreme court interpreted the contractual clause, reasoning that “suit”
encompasses any proceeding by a party in court and that a proceeding includes any
ancillary steps, such as the enforcement of a judgment.290 Noting that contractual
attorneys’ fees provisions must be construed broadly to promote efficient litigation, the
court determined that O’Connell should have been awarded attorneys’ fees for the fees
incurred to collect on his judgment.291 Reversing, the supreme court held that a
contractual provision requiring that a party pay attorneys’ fees in any lawsuit concerning
the contract also requires the party to pay attorneys’ fees for costs incurred to collect on a
judgment.292
Safar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
In Safar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,293 the supreme court held that, for a verbal agreement
to be enforceable through promissory estoppel, there must be an actual promise of action
or forbearance that shows an intent to be bound to a contract with specified terms.294
Safar contracted to construct six units in a condominium project.295 Partway through
construction, Safar used up all of the money Wells Fargo had loaned to him.296 Safar put
up his personal funds to make ends meet based on an alleged agreement that Wells Fargo
would reimburse him.297 The trial court found that no such agreement existed.298 The
supreme court noted that an actual promise (one of the necessary components of a verbal
contract) must use precise language, contain basic terms of the agreement, and show an
286
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intent to be bound by the contract.299 Safar could not identify any of the basic terms of the
alleged agreement, not even the amount of money that Wells Fargo would loan to him.300
The supreme court affirmed and held that, for a verbal agreement to be enforceable
through promissory estoppel, there must be an actual promise of action or forbearance
that shows an intent to be bound to a contract with specified terms.301
Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc.
In Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc.,302 the supreme court held that a duty to
inquire whether a mistake has been made in a contract bid does not arise if the bidder
bears the risk of its own mistake.303 Handle Construction Company (Handle) bid on a
construction contract for Norcon.304 As the result of a unilateral mistake, Handle’s bid
was 35 percent lower than any other bidder.305 Handle later sued Norcon for the
additional costs that Handle had incurred during the construction.306 The superior court
held that Handle bore the risk of its unilateral mistake and granted summary judgment to
Norcon.307 On appeal, Handle argued that a 35 percent difference between Handle’s bid
and any of the other bids should have alerted Norcon to a potential mistake and that
Norcon had thus been obligated to inquire whether a mistake had been made.308 The
supreme court reasoned that Handle’s argument, which was based on the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, does not apply to a party (like Handle) that bears the risk of its
own mistake.309 The court further noted that, even if Handle had not borne the risk of its
own mistake, a 35 percent difference would have been insufficient to create a duty, on
Norcon’s part, to inquire.310 Affirming, the supreme court held that a duty to inquire
whether a mistake has been made in a contract bid does not arise if the bidder bears the
risk of its own mistake.311
Chambers v. Scofield
In Chambers v. Scofield,312 the supreme court held that the term “fair market cost,” in a
settlement agreement regarding compensation for improvements made to property, does
not encompass the time a party spends supervising the improvements.313 Chambers
bought a triplex from Carley.314 Two years later, Carley’s daughter entered into a
settlement agreement with Chambers to rescind the sale and compensate Chambers for
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the “fair market cost” of improvements he had made to the property.315 Chambers filed a
motion to enforce the agreement, claiming that he was owed compensation for
supervising the improvements and that such supervision falls under the category of
“profit and overhead” typically charged to general contractors.316 Interpreting the
agreement, the supreme court reasoned that it did not include the cost of supervising
improvements because supervision was not mentioned in the agreement and because
there is no industry standard clearly indicating that “fair market cost” includes the
supervision of repairs.317 The court stated that if Chambers had desired a credit for
supervision, he should have included that provision in the agreement.318 The supreme
court held that the term “fair market cost,” in a settlement agreement regarding
compensation for improvements made to property, does not encompass the time a party
spends supervising the improvements.319
Erkins v. Alaska Trustee, LLC
In Erkins v. Alaska Trustee, LLC,320 the supreme court held that a disguised settlement
provision in a forbearance agreement could constitute constructive fraud. 321 Erkins sued
Alaska Trustee, alleging fraud and misrepresentation in relation to a foreclosure
proceeding on a delinquent loan.322 Alaska Trustee proposed a forbearance agreement
staying the foreclosure proceeding for five months and Erkins agreed. 323 One paragraph
buried in the agreement was titled “RELEASE OF CLAIMS,” but the paragraph was not
discussed or negotiated.324 The superior court construed the provision as a full waiver of
Erkins’ claims and granted summary judgment to Alaska Trustee.325 On appeal, the
supreme court reasoned that the agreement did not contain the terms that would be
expected in a settlement agreement, and that a waiver of claims had not been discussed or
highlighted as a central part of the agreement; thus, Alaska Trustee had an obligation to
bring the waiver-of-claims language to Erkins’ attention.326 Reversing, the supreme court
held that a disguised settlement provision in a forbearance agreement could constitute
constructive fraud.327
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CRIMINAL LAW
top
Alaska Court of Appeals
Lord v. State
In Lord v. State,328 the court of appeals held that the State’s “not guilty by reason of
insanity” (NGRI) defense statutes are constitutional because the State must still prove the
mental state required under any particular criminal statute.329 After a murder trial, Lord
was found guilty but mentally ill.330 On appeal, she argued that the statutes setting out the
NGRI defense were unconstitutional because they permit conviction when the defendant
does not have the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct. 331 The court of
appeals noted that the U.S. Constitution does not require an inquiry into a defendant’s
mental state so long as the government proves that she acted with the mens rea required
by a criminal statute.332 The court of appeals also rejected the notion that the Alaska
Constitution should be interpreted more broadly than the U.S. Constitution because the
determination of the point at which a defendant’s mental condition justifies exculpation is
a question for the legislature, not the judiciary.333 Affirming, the court of appeals held
that the State’s NGRI defense statutes are constitutional because the State must still prove
the mental state required under the particular criminal statute.334
Liddicoat v. State
In Liddicoat v. State,335 the court of appeals held that a steak knife constitutes a “deadly
weapon” for the purposes of the fifth-degree weapons misconduct statute.336 Liddicoat
was convicted of fifth-degree weapons misconduct for carrying a concealed steak
knife.337 The weapons statute defines a “deadly weapon” as a weapon that is “designed
for and capable of causing death or serious physical injury.”338 On appeal, Liddicoat
argued that, because a steak knife is not designed to cause serious physical injury, the
trial court should have granted him a directed verdict.339 The court of appeals noted that
the statute’s examples of “deadly weapons” included some (an axe, for example) that are
not designed to cause serious physical injury.340 Further, that the legislature had excluded
ordinary pocket knives from previous weapons statutes signaled that the legislature had
intended to include other types of knives in the current weapons statute. 341 Accordingly,
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the court of appeals held that a steak knife constitutes a “deadly weapon” for the purposes
of the fifth-degree weapons misconduct statute.342
Strane v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Strane v. Municipality of Anchorage,343 the court of appeals held that, for the
Municipality of Anchorage’s concealment of merchandise ordinance to be constitutional,
the government must prove that the defendant knowingly placed merchandise out of sight
and did so with the intent to conceal the merchandise from its rightful owner.344 Strane
placed items from his shopping cart into plastic bags.345 After bypassing the checkout
aisles and nearing the exit door, Strane noticed a uniformed manager standing nearby.346
He abandoned his cart, attempted to leave the store, and was arrested.347 At trial, the
judge did not instruct the jury that, to find Strane guilty, the Municipality was required to
prove that he had acted with the intent to hide the merchandise.348 On review, the court of
appeals reasoned that there are a number of potential innocent circumstances in which
individuals might conceal a purchased or unpurchased item that they intend to pay for
before leaving a store.349 Therefore, the ordinance must be interpreted to require proof of
something more than a person’s act of knowingly concealing merchandise while on
commercial premises.350 Reversing, the court of appeals held that, for the Municipality of
Anchorage’s concealment of merchandise ordinance to be constitutional, the government
must prove that the defendant knowingly placed merchandise out of sight and did so with
the intent to conceal the merchandise from its rightful owner.351
Dawson v. State
In Dawson v. State,352 the court of appeals held that Alaska’s disorderly conduct statute,
AS 11.61.110, which prohibits “fighting other than in self-defense,” requires fighters to
have a mutuality of intent and therefore does not cover all situations where one person
strikes another.353 Dawson was charged with fourth-degree assault for striking her
domestic partner with her fists and a baking pan.354 At trial, her attorney requested a jury
instruction on the lesser offense of disorderly conduct.355 The lower court refused to grant
the request, concluding that “fighting,” as used in the context of the disorderly conduct
statute, required a mutual physical struggle.356 Dawson was convicted of assault and
appealed.357 The court of appeals extensively reviewed similar common law statutes and
342
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the current disorderly-conduct statute’s legislative history.358 In doing so, the court
recognized that it had erred in a previous, unpublished opinion in which it had held that
the term “fighting” included fights that are one-sided due to the choice, surprise, or
superior ability of one of the fighters.359 Affirming, the court of appeals held that the
disorderly conduct statute requires fighters to have a mutuality of intent and therefore
does not cover all situations where one person strikes another.360
Olson v. State
In Olson v. State,361 the court of appeals held that a hand cannot be considered a
“dangerous instrument” for purposes of first-degree assault when no evidence is
presented showing that the assault was likely to inflict serious injury.362 Olson hit his
girlfriend with an open hand.363 The blow broke her jaw.364 He was convicted of firstand second-degree assault.365 The superior court granted Olson’s motion for acquittal on
the first-degree assault charge because Olson had not used a “dangerous instrument” in
the attack.366 The State argued on appeal that Olson had used his hand as a “dangerous
instrument” and that it was therefore error for the lower court to grant a judgment of
acquittal for the first-degree assault charge.367 The court of appeals noted that, when
determining whether a “dangerous instrument” was used in an assault, the fact finder
must examine the consequences that were reasonably likely to ensue from the defendant’s
actions (given the type of object used and the circumstances in which the object was
used).368 Applying this test, the court determined that there was no evidence, aside from
the injury, that Olson used his hand in a manner that was likely to cause death or inflict
serious injury.369 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a hand cannot be considered a
“dangerous instrument” for purposes of first-degree assault when no evidence is
presented showing that the assault was likely to inflict serious injury.370
Rupeiks v. State
In Rupeiks v. State,371 the court of appeals held that a hand may be deemed a “dangerous
instrument” to support a conviction of third-degree assault when the manner of the
assault shows the presence of an actual and substantial risk of serious bodily injury or
death.372 Rupeiks drove to Christensen’s campsite after they had a disagreement.373 When
Christensen approached Rupeiks’ truck and bent down to identify the driver, Rupeiks
358
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grabbed Christensen’s arm and yanked his torso into the truck.374 Rupeiks then clubbed
Christensen in the face, and drove the vehicle while continuing to hold Christensen’s
arm.375 The jury found Rupeiks guilty of third-degree assault and agreed in a special
verdict form that Rupeiks’ hand or fist had been used as a “dangerous instrument.”376
Rupeiks appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s
finding.377 The court of appeals reasoned that the manner and circumstances of the assault
showed that Rupeiks had used his hand as a “dangerous instrument.” 378 Rupeiks had
used his hand to hold Christensen’s arm in the truck, which substantially limited
Christensen’s ability to defend himself.379 Moreover, the jury heard testimony that
Rupeiks had punched Christensen in the face repeatedly, with enough force to fracture his
facial bones.380 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a hand may be deemed a
“dangerous instrument” to support a conviction of third-degree assault when the manner
of the assault shows the presence of an actual and substantial risk of serious bodily injury
or death.381
Delay-Wilson v. State
In Delay-Wilson v. State,382 the court of appeals held that criminal liability for issuing a
bad check is not established by merely endorsing a check issued by a third party.383 A
company issued a check to Delay-Wilson’s daughter, who in turn endorsed it payable to
Delay-Wilson; Delay-Wilson then endorsed the bad check and deposited it in her own
bank account.384 Delay-Wilson was convicted of issuing a bad check.385 On appeal, she
argued that simply signing the check was not sufficient to establish liability under the
statute governing the offense of issuing a bad check.386 The court of appeals analyzed the
language of the bad-check statute, finding that the offense requires proof that the
defendant authorized the check in question.387 Because the check at issue purported to
authorize payment from a third party’s account, Delay-Wilson did not actually authorize
payment from an account she owned.388 Reversing, the court of appeals held that criminal
liability for issuing a bad check is not established by merely endorsing a check issued by
a third party.389
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Darroux v. State
In Darroux v. State,390 the court of appeals held that the statutory mitigator in
AS 12.55.155(d)(7) cannot be used to reduce the presumptive sentence of a defendant
who has already successfully argued that he should be convicted of a lesser included
offense based on a claim of provocation.391 Darroux shot and killed a man; although he
was charged with second-degree murder, a jury found him guilty of manslaughter
because he had been “serious[ly] provo[ked].”392 Darroux argued that his presumptive
sentence should be mitigated because AS 12.55.155(d)(7) provides that a mitigating
factor can be found if “the victim provoked the crime to a significant degree.” The
superior court rejected Darroux’s proposed mitigating factor and Darroux appealed.393
The court of appeals noted that the degree of provocation necessary to apply the
mitigating factor in AS 12.55.155(d)(6), “serious provocation,” is the same degree of
provocation that is necessary to reduce a murder to manslaughter. 394 But AS 12.55.155(e)
forbids the application of a mitigating factor that was raised at trial and reduced the
defendant’s conviction to a lesser included offense.395 The court reasoned that it would be
illogical to forbid the defendant from mitigating his sentence due to “serious
provocation” under AS 12.55.155(d)(6), but then allow the defendant to mitigate his
sentence due to lesser, “significant,” provocation under AS 12.55.155(d)(7).396
Affirming, the court of appeals held that the statutory mitigator in AS 12.55.155(d)(7)
cannot be used to reduce the presumptive sentence of a defendant who has already
successfully argued that he should be convicted of a lesser included offense based on a
claim of provocation.397
Wiglesworth v. State
In Wiglesworth v. State,398 the court of appeals held that a defendant can only be
convicted of one count of second-degree controlled substance misconduct when evidence
shows that he possessed several different prohibited substances, on several different
occasions, in the course of an ongoing methamphetamine manufacturing scheme.399
Police investigation revealed that on three dates Wiglesworth possessed several
chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine.400 He was charged with six counts of
second-degree controlled substance misconduct, one for each substance and date, and
convicted on each count.401 He appealed and argued that, because he possessed the
chemicals as part of one ongoing manufacturing operation, he should have been
convicted of only one count.402 The court of appeals concluded that the gravamen of the
offense is the assembly of materials necessary to manufacture methamphetamine, and
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there is no societal interest in the accused’s possession of each individual chemical.403
The court reasoned that it would be illogical to convict a defendant of multiple felony
counts (one for each ingredient) if he was interrupted partway through the manufacturing
process, but of only one count if he completed the same process.404 Reversing, the court
of appeals held that a defendant can only be convicted of one count of second-degree
controlled substance misconduct when evidence shows that he possessed several different
prohibited substances, on several different occasions, in the course of an ongoing
methamphetamine manufacturing scheme.405
Scharen v. State
In Scharen v. State,406 the court of appeals held that, in a driving-under-the-influence
case, an individual who turned on his car in order to stay warm after leaving a bar is not
entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of necessity.407 Scharen left a bar, planning to
sleep in his car, and started the engine for warmth.408 At trial, Scharen requested a jury
instruction on the defense of necessity; the district court refused to give the instruction. 409
The court of appeals reasoned that Scharen was not entitled to a jury instruction on the
defense of necessity because he knowingly brought about the dangerous situation (death
or serious injury due to freezing) by leaving the bar with the intention of sleeping in his
car.410 Additionally, the court of appeals noted that Scharen had reasonable alternatives to
prevent the dangerous situation which would not have required him to operate a motor
vehicle.411 The court of appeals held that, in a driving-under-the-influence case, an
individual who turned on his car in order to stay warm after leaving a bar is not entitled to
a jury instruction on the defense of necessity.412
Leu v. State
In Leu v. State,413 the court of appeals held that Alaska’s domestic violence statute, which
applies to individuals who “have engaged in a sexual relationship,” is not
unconstitutionally vague.414 Leu and his friend had sex on occasion, but had not had sex
for five months.415 Leu and his friend were drinking, began fighting, and Leu punched his
friend repeatedly.416 A jury convicted Leu of fourth-degree domestic violence assault.417
At sentencing, the district court held that Leu’s assault qualified as a domestic violence
crime because Leu and the victim had previously engaged in a sexual relationship.418 On
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appeal, Leu argued that the domestic violence statute was unconstitutionally vague on its
face.419 The court of appeals reasoned that (1) the term “sexual relationship” is not so
ambiguous that it gives inadequate notice of what conduct it proscribes in every instance
and (2) Leu had not presented any evidence of selective or arbitrary enforcement.420
Affirming, the court of appeals held that Alaska’s domestic violence statute, which
applies to individuals who “have engaged in a sexual relationship,” is not
unconstitutionally vague.421
Bridge v. State
In Bridge v. State,422 the court of appeals held that an escapee cannot be charged with
second-degree felony escape from a correctional facility unless the escapee’s presence at
the facility is forcibly maintained by corrections officers or guards acting as agents of the
Department of Corrections (DOC).423 Bridge was charged with a misdemeanor and,
when he was unable to make bail, was placed in a halfway house under contract with
DOC.424 Bridge left the halfway house without permission and was later arrested and
charged with second-degree felony escape.425 At trial, the judge instructed the jury that
the halfway house was a “correctional facility” under the statute, without hearing
evidence regarding the restraints used on individuals in the halfway house.426 On appeal
following his conviction, Bridge argued that the halfway house was not a “correctional
facility” within the meaning of the felony escape statute.427 The court of appeals agreed,
determining that a “correctional facility” did not include any facility used for housing a
person under official detention but was instead limited to facilities used for the
confinement of detained persons.428 The court defined a facility for confinement as one
which employs physical restraints and guards for the purpose of maintaining security
over prisoners required to remain in that facility.429 Reversing, the court of appeals held
that an escapee cannot be charged with second-degree felony escape from a correctional
facility unless the escapee’s presence at the facility is forcibly maintained by corrections
officers or guards acting as agents of DOC.430
Cleveland v. State
In Cleveland v. State,431 the court of appeals held that an individual may be convicted of a
separate kidnapping offense when the evidence shows that the restraint used in the
kidnapping is more than merely incidental to the commission of another offense.432
Cleveland and two others took a woman to a trailer, where over the course of at least two
419
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days they threatened her, beat her, and sexually abused her.433 Cleveland was convicted
of sexual assault, coercion, kidnapping, assault, misconduct involving a weapon, and
harassment.434 Cleveland appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to
establish the element of restraint for the kidnapping conviction.435 The court of appeals
recognized that a restraint merely incidental to another offense does not constitute a
separate offense.436 The court upheld the conviction, however, identifying five factors to
consider in determining whether a restraint was incidental to the other offense: (1) the
duration of the restraint, (2) the movement of the victim during the restraint, (3) whether
the restraint exceeded what was necessary for the commission of the other offenses,
(4) whether the restraint increased the risk of harm beyond the other offenses, and
(5) whether the restraint had some independent purpose.437 The court reasoned that,
although the trial court had not instructed the jury on these factors, the evidence in the
case was sufficient to find that the kidnapping was not incidental to Cleveland’s separate
offenses.438 The court of appeals held that an individual may be convicted of a separate
kidnapping offense when the evidence shows that the restraint used in the kidnapping is
more than merely incidental to the commission of another offense.439
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Kalmakoff v. State
In Kalmakoff v. State,440 the supreme court held that (1) a fifteen-year-old is “in custody”
for Miranda purposes when he has no previous history of contact with law enforcement
and is called out of class by his principal, driven by a police officer to an interview with
police, and not told that he is free to leave; and (2) when the police have flagrantly
violated a suspect’s right to silence during an interview, subsequent interviews are
sufficiently tainted to require suppression if the police obtained important incriminating
information from the suspect during the first interview and then use that information to
convince the suspect to acquiesce to further interviews.441 Fifteen year-old Kalmakoff
was interviewed four times by police in connection with a murder.442 Kalmakoff was
pulled out of a classroom by his principal; a police officer then drove him to the city
office for questioning.443 The police officers did not tell Kalmakoff he was free to leave,
nor did they give him Miranda warnings.444 During the course of questioning, he made
433
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incriminating statements.445 At another interview at the city office the following day,
Kalmakoff told the officers that he wanted to stop the interview and go back to school,
but the officers continued questioning him.446 Three hours later, the officers went to
Kalmakoff’s home and (again without giving Miranda warnings) encouraged him to tell
his grandparents what he had already told the officers.447 Kalmakoff again made
incriminating statements.448 The next day, the officers took Kalmakoff out of class and
asked him to show them the murder site.449 Kalmakoff made several more incriminating
statements, at which point the officers administered Miranda warnings.450 The officers
then videotaped Kalmakoff’s confession while he showed them the crime scene.451 The
superior court held, first, that Kalmakoff had not been in custody when he was taken
from the school to his first interview; second, that he had been in custody for his second
interview, and the failure to give Miranda warnings rendered those statements
inadmissible; third, that he had not been in custody for the third interview, and that the
taint of the earlier Miranda violation was sufficiently attenuated to render those
statements admissible; and fourth, that he had validly waived his Miranda rights during
the fourth interview, rendering his confession admissible.452 The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that the last two interviews were admissible because they were not
tainted by the earlier Miranda violations.453 The court of appeals determined that it did
not have enough information about the first interview to decide whether Kalmakoff had
been in custody when he was taken to the city office but that any error in admitting the
statements from the first interview was harmless.454 The supreme court granted leave to
appeal and remanded for fact-finding regarding the first interview.455 The court
determined that, although Kalmakoff had not been formally arrested prior to his first
interview, his freedom of movement had been so restrained that a reasonable person in
his position would not have felt free to leave or to stop the questioning. 456 The court
noted his age, that he had been escorted by a police officer from the school to the city
office, that he was not offered the opportunity to speak with his family before the
interview, and that the officers questioned Kalmakoff in an accusatory manner. 457 The
court then noted that Kalmakoff had been in custody for the second interview but had not
received Miranda warnings and that, when he had invoked his right to silence, the
officers had ignored him and continued the questioning.458 Finally, the court determined
that the officers’ flagrant Miranda violations in the first and second interviews
sufficiently tainted the last two interviews to render statements from those interviews
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inadmissible.459 In particular, the court noted that the officers had asked Kalmakoff to
repeat and explain incriminating statements that he had made during the earlier, improper
interviews.460 Reversing, the supreme court held that 1) a fifteen-year-old is “in custody”
for Miranda purposes when he has no previous history of contact with law enforcement
and is called out of a class by his principal, driven by a police officer to an interview with
police, and not told that he is free to leave; and 2) when the police have flagrantly
violated a suspect’s right to silence during an interview, subsequent interviews are
sufficiently tainted to require suppression if the police obtained important incriminating
information from the suspect during the first interview and then use that information to
convince the suspect to acquiesce to further interviews.461
Olson v. State
In Olson v. State,462 the supreme court held that when the police voluntarily give
information to an arrestee, and that information turns out to be incorrect, the arrestee
bears the burden of proving prejudice from the erroneous communication.463 Olson was
arrested for driving while intoxicated and the police asked for a breath sample.464
Because the police were required to inform him of the consequences of refusal, an officer
read to him an implied consent form.465 The form was out-of-date and stated that, if an
arrestee was convicted twice in the previous five years of driving while intoxicated or
refusing to take a chemical test, refusing to take the breath test could result in a class C
felony.466 But the law had changed to include a ten year look-back provision.467 Olson,
who had two violations from the previous six years, refused the test and was convicted of
a class C felony.468 Olson appealed, claiming that his due process rights had been violated
by the improper notice.469 The lower court ruled in favor of the State, holding that Olson
was required to show that the misinformation actually induced him to refuse the chemical
test and that Olson had not shown sufficient evidence of inducement.470 Although the
supreme court agreed with the lower court, holding that Olson must produce evidence
that he was actually prejudiced by the improper warning, the court reversed and
remanded the case.471 The court reasoned that Olson had not been aware that he needed to
produce evidence that his refusal to take the breath test was induced by the
misinformation he received, and a remand was necessary to allow him the opportunity to
make that showing.472 The supreme court held that when the police voluntarily give
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information to an arrestee, and that information turns out to be incorrect, the arrestee
bears the burden of proving prejudice from the erroneous communication.473
State v. Carlin
In State v. Carlin,474 the supreme court held that, if a criminal defendant dies while
appealing a conviction, the conviction will stand unless the defendant’s estate proceeds
with an appeal.475 Carlin died in prison while directly appealing his conviction.476 The
supreme court had previously adopted the doctrine of abatement ab initio, under which
appellate courts permanently abated a criminal defendant’s conviction if the criminal
defendant died while his appeal was pending.477 The court decided to depart from that
doctrine for two reasons. First, legal conditions had changed because victims’ rights had
recently been expanded and other states had recently diversified their positions on
abatement.478 Second, the benefits to crime victims of rejecting the doctrine of full
abatement outweighed the benefits of stare decisis.479 The supreme court held that, if a
criminal defendant dies while appealing a conviction, the conviction will stand unless the
defendant’s estate proceeds with an appeal.480
Adams v. State
In Adams v. State,481 the supreme court held that the admission of a prosecutor’s
comments about a defendant’s pre- or post-arrest silence constitutes plain error.482
During the defendant’s trial for sexual assault, the prosecutor asked the defendant on
cross-examination to admit that he had refused to speak with the police.483 The
prosecutor also highlighted the defendant’s pretrial silence during the closing statement,
arguing that the defendant’s refusal to speak undermined his credibility and that the
defendant had changed his decision to remain silent only after learning that DNA
evidence showed that he had had sex with the victim.484 Although Adams’ attorney did
not object to either the cross-examination or the closing argument, Adams argued on
appeal that the trial court’s admission of the prosecutor’s comments was plain error.485
The court of appeals concluded that the admission of the prosecutor’s statements had not
amounted to plain error.486 The supreme court disagreed, explaining that the Alaska
Constitution protects a criminal defendant’s post-arrest silence to a greater degree than
the U.S. Constitution.487 But the supreme court decided that it did not need to determine
in this case whether the Alaska Constitution protects pre-arrest statements to the same
473
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extent that it protects post-arrest statements.488 The court noted that Evidence Rule 403
protects a defendant’s pre-arrest silence by rendering it inadmissible in most cases
because the high risk of unfair prejudice usually outweighs its inherently low probative
value.489 Reversing, the supreme court held that the admission of a prosecutor’s
comments about a defendant’s pre- or post-arrest silence constitutes plain error.490
Stone v. State
In Stone v. State,491 the supreme court held that the U.S. Constitution requires that courtappointed counsel, upon request by a defendant, file a petition for discretionary sentence
review after the defendant has been sentenced pursuant to a lawful plea agreement.492
Stone was charged with manslaughter and submitted to a plea agreement.493 He received
a sentence which, excluding a suspended portion, did not exceed his plea agreement.494
Stone wanted to appeal his sentence as excessive, but his counsel concluded that Stone
had no appealable issues and took no further action.495 After the lower courts upheld the
attorney’s refusal to assist Stone with an appeal, Stone petitioned the supreme court,
arguing that he had a federal constitutional right to require his counsel to seek appellate
review.496 The supreme court agreed.497 Although a defendant may not appeal a sentence
that is in accordance with a negotiated plea agreement, a defendant may file a petition for
discretionary review under the Alaska appellate rules.498 The court held that a defendant’s
right to counsel allows the defendant to require his counsel to assist him with this
petition.499 The court further stated that if counsel feels that the defendant’s claim is
“wholly frivolous,” the attorney must get the court’s permission to withdraw from the
case.500 Granting Stone leave to file a petition for review of his sentence, the court held
that the U.S. Constitution requires that court-appointed counsel, upon request by a
defendant, file a petition for discretionary sentence review after the defendant has been
sentenced pursuant to a lawful plea agreement.501
Alaska Court of Appeals
Weil v. State
In Weil v. State,502 the court of appeals held that an officer is justified in making a
community caretaker stop if the officer acts to prevent a potential hazard to the public.503
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Weil was riding his four-wheeler down a gravel road at night, heading toward a busy
road.504 Weil’s dog was walking in the middle of the road, tethered to Weil’s fourwheeler by a twenty-foot leash.505 An officer stopped Weil before the four-wheeler or the
dog reached the main road, and the officer noticed that Weil was intoxicated.506 Weil was
charged with driving under the influence.507 Arguing that the stop was not supported by
reasonable suspicion, Weil moved to suppress the evidence.508 The officer testified that
he had stopped Weil because he had thought it would have been dangerous for Weil and
Weil’s dog to cross the highway.509 The lower court denied the motion to suppress and
held that the stop was a valid community caretaker stop.510 The court of appeals affirmed,
reasoning that the stop had not been investigatory, but rather had been made to avoid a
potentially dangerous situation.511 Because Weil’s conduct had posed an imminent public
danger, the officer had been warranted in stopping Weil before an accident occurred.512
Affirming, the court of appeals held that an officer is justified in making a community
caretaker stop if the officer acts to prevent a potential hazard to the public.513
Estes v. State
In Estes v. State,514 the court of appeals held that out-of-court statements, introduced to
provide necessary context for understanding admissible evidence, do not violate the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.515 Estes and her husband were charged with the
murder of Estes’ cousin.516 Estes was convicted of first-degree murder.517 At Estes’
murder trial, the State introduced the contents of a phone conversation between Estes and
her husband’s cousin and another conversation between Estes and state troopers.518 On
appeal, Estes argued that these out-of-court statements constituted “testimonial hearsay”
and were therefore inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.519 The court of appeals
determined that the evidence had a non-hearsay purpose because it allowed the jury to
understand admissible evidence; it had not been offered to prove the truth of the
conversations’ contents.520 Affirming, the court of appeals held that out-of-court
statements, introduced to provide necessary context for understanding admissible
evidence, do not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.521
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James v. State
In James v. State,522 the court of appeals held that sex offender educational classes can be
imposed as parole conditions, without violating the federal and state ex post facto
clauses, on prisoners who were convicted before the enactment of a 1985 statute that
specifically authorized such educational classes.523 James was convicted of attempted
sexual assault and sexual abuse of a minor in 1979.524 In 1985 Alaska enacted a statute
authorizing courts to impose mandatory attendance of sex offender education classes for
sex offenders.525 James was paroled subject to conditions including the attendance of a
sex offender education class; when he refused to cooperate with his treatment, his parole
was revoked and the revocation was upheld by the superior court.526 The court of appeals
reasoned that, although the 1985 parole statute specifically authorized sex offender
classes, a statute in force when James was convicted had generally authorized courts to
impose special parole conditions (including, presumably, sex offender classes).527
Affirming, the court of appeals held that sex offender educational classes can be imposed
as parole conditions, without violating the federal and state ex post facto clauses, on
prisoners who were convicted before the enactment of a 1985 statute that specifically
authorized such educational classes.528
Lindeman v. State
In Lindeman v. State,529 the court of appeals held that, when supplemental jury
instructions constructively amend an indictment, an appellate attorney provides
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise a constructive amendment
argument.530 Lindeman was charged with first-degree murder in an indictment alleging
that Lindeman had assaulted his victim, intending to cause death.531 The jury convicted
Lindeman of second-degree murder following a supplemental jury instruction stating that
the jury could convict under a theory of extreme indifference. 532 At a post-conviction
relief hearing, the superior court held that Lindeman’s lawyer had provided ineffective
assistance by failing to raise a constructive amendment argument.533 The court of appeals
reasoned that there were reasonably promising arguments that the supplemental jury
instruction constituted a constructive amendment of Lindeman’s indictment and that
Lindeman had been prejudiced by the constructive amendment because he had lost the
opportunity to present any evidence or arguments against the new theory.534 The court of
appeals held that, when supplemental jury instructions constructively amend an
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indictment, an appellate attorney provides ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
raise a constructive amendment argument.535
Korkow v. State
In Korkow v. State,536 the court of appeals held that, when a defendant has received a
lengthy prison sentence and is not statutorily eligible for parole until far into the future, it
may be excessive for the sentencing judge to restrict the defendant’s eligibility for parole
beyond the statutory restriction.537 Korkow killed his wife, stabbing her at least sixty-two
times while the couple’s children were present.538 He was convicted of first-degree
murder.539 Although he did not have an extensive prior criminal history, he was
sentenced to the maximum term of ninety-nine years in prison.540 The trial judge then
restricted Korkow’s eligibility for parole until after he had served fifty years.541 This
restriction was based both on the severity of his attack and on the presence of children
during the murder.542 The court of appeals noted that, by statute, Korkow would have
been required to serve at least thirty-three years before becoming eligible for parole.543
The court stated that, when a defendant will be serving a lengthy sentence, it is preferable
to allow questions of discretionary parole release to be decided by the Parole Board.544
Reversing, the court of appeals held that, when a defendant has received a lengthy prison
sentence and is not statutorily eligible for parole until far into the future, it may be
excessive for the sentencing judge to restrict the defendant’s eligibility for parole beyond
the statutory restriction.545
Bates v. State
In Bates v. State,546 the court of appeals held that the statutory definition of “household
member,” which is incorporated into the rules of evidence, is not impermissibly vague.547
Bates was convicted of assault and attempted murder after he attacked his former
girlfriend and two other people in her apartment.548 The lower court concluded that Bates'
former girlfriend was a “household member” as defined by statute because they had dated
and had been involved in a sexual relationship.549 The attack was thus a crime of
domestic violence which, under the rules of evidence, allowed the State to present
evidence of Bates’ two prior assaults.550 On appeal, Bates argued that the definitions of
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“sexual relationship” and “dating” were impermissibly vague.551 The court of appeals
reasoned that, because Bates challenged a rule of evidence and not a substantive criminal
law, the traditional problems with vagueness did not apply; therefore, for the statute to be
impermissibly vague, it would have to be impossible for a court to give it meaning.552
The court determined that both “dating” and “sexual relationship” were definite enough
to be given meaning.553 Thus, the court of appeals held that the statutory definition of
“household member,” which is incorporated into the rules of evidence, is not
impermissibly vague.554
Langevin v. State
In Langevin v. State,555 the court of appeals held that (1) whether the state has introduced
sufficient corroborating evidence to admit a defendant's confession is an evidentiary
question to be determined by a judge and (2) if the judge erroneously admits a
confession, the remedy is a new trial rather than an acquittal.556 Langevin was convicted
of driving under the influence, based solely on his confession, despite his objection to the
confession’s introduction as evidence.557 Under state law, a defendant cannot be
convicted based solely on his or her confession.558 The court of appeals reasoned that,
since the rule against uncorroborated confessions is more like a rule of evidence than an
element of any crime, the determination of whether a confession is corroborated should
be made by the trial judge.559 The court further reasoned that, since the remedy for
evidentiary errors is a new trial rather than an acquittal, Langevin should be entitled only
to a new trial.560 Reversing, the court of appeals held that (1) whether the state has
introduced sufficient corroborating evidence to admit a defendant's confession is an
evidentiary question to be determined by a judge and (2) if the judge erroneously admits
a confession, the remedy is a new trial rather than an acquittal.561
Booth v. State
In Booth v. State,562 the court of appeals held that when a defendant (1) shows that
information possibly contained in a police officer’s personnel file would be relevant to
the defendant’s guilt or innocence and (2) presents a factual predicate for the discovery
request, the officer’s personnel file should be inspected by the trial judge in camera to
determine whether information in the personnel file should be disclosed.563 Booth was
charged with resisting arrest.564 He defended himself by arguing that the arresting officers
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had fabricated a resisting-arrest charge to cover up their use of excessive force. 565 Booth
moved the district court to compel the State to produce the officers’ personnel files.566
The trial judge rejected his motion, refused to inspect the files in camera, and Booth was
convicted.567 The court of appeals determined that the type of information requested in
Booth’s discovery motion, if found in the personnel files, would likely have been relevant
to the Booth’s guilt or innocence.568 Furthermore, the court determined that Booth had
presented a factual predicate for the request.569 Remanding for further proceedings, the
court of appeals held that when a defendant (1) shows that information possibly
contained in a police officer’s personnel file would be relevant to the defendant’s guilt or
innocence and (2) presents a factual predicate for the discovery request, the officer’s
personnel file should be inspected by the trial judge in camera to determine whether
information in the personnel file should be disclosed.570
Pomeroy v. State
In Pomeroy v. State,571 the court of appeals held that, for the purposes of
Civil Rule 42(c)(1), a second post-conviction relief application is the same action as the
first application, and a prisoner who waives his right to a peremptory challenge in the
first application also waives his right to a peremptory challenge in the second
application.572 Pomeroy filed an application for post-conviction relief which the superior
court dismissed.573 Pomeroy filed a second application, which the same superior court
judge also dismissed.574 Pomeroy appealed the dismissal, arguing that the judge should
not have adjudicated the second application because Pomeroy had filed a peremptory
challenge of the judge under Rule 42(c)(1). The court of appeals noted that, generally, a
party has a right under Rule 42(c)(1) to peremptorily challenge a judge. 575 But a party
loses that right when new proceedings are collaterally related to previous proceedings in
which the party had waived its right to a peremptory challenge. 576 The court determined
that the two post-conviction applications were collaterally related to each other, and that,
in the first proceeding, Pomeroy had waived his right to peremptorily challenge the
superior court judge.577 Affirming, the court of appeals held that, for the purposes of
Rule 42(c)(1), a second post-conviction relief application is the same action as the first
application, and a prisoner who waives his right to a peremptory challenge in the first
application also waives his right to a peremptory challenge in the second application.578
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Taylor v. State
In Taylor v. State,579 the court of appeals held that, after a jury’s conviction, a presiding
judge should only grant a new trial when the evidence is so one-sided that the jury’s
contrary view is plainly unjust.580 Taylor was convicted of second-degree theft, which
required the State to prove that he had stolen an item worth $500 or more.581 He argued
that the evidence proving the value of the stolen item was so questionable that it
warranted a new trial under Criminal Rule 33.582 The trial judge refused to grant a new
trial and stated that, although he himself would have acquitted Taylor, enough evidence
had been presented that the jury’s verdict could not be called unjust. 583 The court of
appeals noted that a simple disagreement with a jury’s verdict is not enough to warrant a
new trial.584 The trial judge must instead determine that the jury’s view of the evidence is
plainly unreasonable and unjust.585 Affirming, the court of appeals held that, after a jury’s
conviction, the presiding judge should only grant a new trial when the evidence is so onesided that the jury’s contrary view is plainly unjust.586
Reandeau v. State
In Reandeau v. State,587 the court of appeals held that it does not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate a defendant’s excessive-sentence claim if the defendant’s time to serve is
within the presumptive range.588 Reandeau was given a composite sentence of 52½ years
with 25 years suspended.589 The presumptive sentence for his most serious offense was
15–30 years’ imprisonment.590 He appealed the sentence, arguing that it was excessive.591
The court of appeals noted that, by statute, it only has jurisdiction over sentence appeals
when the defendant has been sentenced to more than two years of incarceration and when
the sentence is outside the presumptive range.592 Reandeau argued that the court should
take into account his 25-year suspended sentence in determining whether it had
jurisdiction.593 After analyzing the legislative history of its jurisdictional statutes, the
court determined that a defendant’s right to a sentence appeal is based on the defendant’s
time to serve without reference to his suspended sentence.594 Referring Reandeau’s
excessive-sentence claim to the supreme court for discretionary review, the court of
appeals held that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a defendant’s excessivesentence claim if the defendant’s time to serve is within the presumptive range.595
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Grove v. State
In Grove v. State,596 the court of appeals held that a statute allowing agency employees,
including employees of the Public Defender Agency, to practice law for ten months
before getting a license did not violate state bar rules.597 Grove challenged his conviction
because the public defender representing him did not have a license and had not been
directly supervised as required by state bar rules.598 The court of appeals reasoned that
the statute allowing employees of the Public Defender Agency to practice for ten months
before getting a license did not violate state bar rules because the statute clearly served as
an alternative to (rather than a contradiction of) current state bar rules.599 The court of
appeals held that a statute allowing agency employees, including employees of the Public
Defender Agency, to practice law for ten months before getting a license did not violate
state bar rules.600
Richards v. State
In Richards v. State,601 the court of appeals held that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to
review a composite sentence for excessiveness when it lacks jurisdiction to review any of
the individual sentences that comprise the composite sentence.602 Richards was convicted
of a felony and a misdemeanor; the superior court imposed a composite sentence of 18
months for both convictions.603 Richards appealed, arguing that his sentence was
excessive.604 The court of appeals noted that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to decide
whether the misdemeanor sentence was excessive because Richards had received more
than 120 days of imprisonment for the misdemeanor.605 But it did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction to decide whether the felony sentence was excessive for two reasons: first, a
defendant has no right to appeal a felony sentence unless the sentence to be served is
more than two years; second, Richards’ sentence was within the presumptive sentence
range for his offense.606 The court decided that it should not consider the misdemeanor
sentence in isolation because many trial judges select a composite total amount of time
for the defendant to serve, then impose individual sentences that add up to that total.607
The court of appeals referred the excessiveness argument to the supreme court and held
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review a composite sentence for excessiveness
when it lacks jurisdiction to review any of the individual sentences that comprise the
composite sentence.608
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Gray v. State
In Gray v. State,609 the court of appeals held that a statute that automatically waives
juvenile jurisdiction for serious offenses does not violate a defendant’s right to equal
protection under the Alaska Constitution.610 Gray, a 16 year-old, was sentenced as an
adult to 65 years for an execution-style murder.611 She had been sentenced as an adult as
a result of an automatic waiver statute which waives juvenile jurisdiction for certain
serious crimes.612 On appeal, she argued that the automatic waiver statute violated her
right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution.613 The court of appeals applied a
three-step analysis. First, it decided that Gray’s interest was the narrow interest of a
convicted offender attempting to minimize her punishment.614 Second, it determined that
the State has a strong interest in imposing punishment and in determining how its
penalties should be applied to different classes of felons.615 Third, the waiver statute
distinguishes minors by the seriousness of their crimes, a classification which bears a
substantial relationship to the purposes of punishment.616 Affirming, the court of appeals
held that a statute that automatically waives juvenile jurisdiction for serious offenses does
not violate a defendant’s right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution.617
Sawyer v. State
In Sawyer v. State,618 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant cannot compel
the State to produce evidence of unrelated prior incidents unless those incidents have
taken place under substantially similar circumstances.619 Sawyer was convicted of firstdegree murder for killing his wife, who was shot while lying in bed.620 At trial, Sawyer
argued that either his wife had committed suicide or his three-year-old son had shot
her.621 Sawyer filed a motion to compel the State to produce the results of state trooper
investigations into incidents in which young children had fired weapons resulting in
injury or death.622 The trial court denied the motion, finding it overbroad and wasteful of
time and resources.623 On appeal, Sawyer argued that the trial court had committed
reversible error because the reports would have contained relevant evidence favorable to
the defense.624 The court of appeals reasoned that the prosecution should not be
compelled to provide evidence that is not reasonably thought to be germane to the
case.625 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant cannot compel the
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State to produce evidence of unrelated prior incidents unless those incidents have taken
place under substantially similar circumstances.626
Beattie v. State
In Beattie v. State,627 the court of appeals held that a defendant waives his right against
double jeopardy if a question is still pending but he does not object to the jury's
dismissal.628 Beattie was tried for a felony driving under the influence charge, which
required the State to prove two prior convictions.629 Beattie bifurcated his trial, separating
the issue of his prior convictions, and failed to object when the jury was dismissed before
hearing the evidence of his prior convictions.630 The court reasoned that, by failing to
object, Beattie had waived his right against double jeopardy and authorized the court to
call a second jury to hear the evidence of his prior convictions.631 The court of appeals
held that a defendant waives his right against double jeopardy if a question is still
pending but he does not object to the jury's dismissal. 632
Shay v. State
In Shay v. State,633 the court of appeals held that statements made to the police during
questioning that occurs on the side of a road, where the individual being questioned is
free to leave and has not been handcuffed, are admissible in court regardless of whether a
Miranda warning has been given.634 Two police officers found Shay one mile away from
an abandoned vehicle that had just sped away from a police stop at an unsafe speed.635
The police questioned Shay without giving him a Miranda warning.636 Based on his
statements, Shay was convicted of several crimes.637 On appeal, he argued that his
statements should not have been admissible because, given the totality of the
circumstances, he had reasonably believed that he was under arrest when the officers
questioned him.638 The court of appeals reasoned that this was a routine investigatory
stop rather than a custodial interrogation (which would have entitled Shay to a Miranda
warning) because the questioning took place on the side of a public road, with only two
officers present, under circumstances that did not have the coercive atmosphere of a
police station.639 Additionally, the court of appeals noted that the officers had not asked
accusatory questions, had not confronted Shay with incriminating evidence, and had not
pressured Shay in any way.640 The court of appeals held that statements made to the
police during questioning that occurs on the side of a road, where the individual being
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questioned is free to leave and has not been handcuffed, are admissible in court
regardless of whether a Miranda warning has been given.641
Burnett v. State
In Burnett v. State,642 the court of appeals held that a driver’s act of unnecessarily
spinning his vehicle's tires, without more, does not establish reasonable suspicion to
believe that the driver is driving negligently.643 At around midnight, a state trooper
observed Burnett’s vehicle stopped at an intersection.644 Burnett then “peeled out” and,
although Burnett made no other driving errors, the trooper initiated a traffic stop
suspecting that Burnett was driving while intoxicated.645 Burnett submitted to a breath
test and was arrested based on the test results.646 He moved to suppress the evidence
obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the stop had not been supported by
reasonable suspicion to believe he had engaged in wrongdoing.647 The district court
denied the motion, holding that the trooper had probable cause to believe that Burnett had
committed the offense of driving negligently, and Burnett was convicted.648 The court of
appeals noted that the State had offered no evidence to suggest that Burnett’s driving had
created an actual danger to persons or property; therefore, there could have been no
reasonable suspicion that Burnett had engaged in negligent driving. 649 Likewise, the facts
could not have created more than a hunch that Burnett had been driving while
impaired.650 In addition, the court dismissed the community caretaker theory offered by
the State because the trooper had failed to testify that he had believed it necessary to
intervene to prevent harm to Burnett or the public.651 Reversing, the court of appeals held
that a driver’s act of unnecessarily spinning his vehicle's tires, without more,
does not establish reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver is driving negligently.652
Ray v. State
In Ray v. State,653 the court of appeals held that a sentencing court does not have the
power, in the absence of express statutory authority, to require a defendant to register as a
sex offender as a condition of his probation.654 Ray was convicted of sexual assault in
1994, before the legislature enacted a statute requiring convicted sex offenders to register
with the State as sex offenders.655 Ray was released on probation and contacted a member
of the victim’s family.656 The superior court found that Ray had violated his probation
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and ordered that, upon Ray’s release, he would have to register as a sex offender under
the sex offender statute.657 Upon review, the court of appeals noted that sentencing courts
must have explicit legislative authorization before imposing conditions of probation that
fundamentally alter the nature of probation.658 The court also referred to a supreme court
decision stating that sex offender registration imposes significant and intrusive
obligations upon a defendant.659 Thus, the court concluded that sex offender registration
was a serious consequence of conviction and could not be imposed without statutory
authority.660 Reversing, the court of appeals held that a sentencing court does not have
the power, in the absence of express statutory authority, to require a defendant to register
as a sex offender as a condition of his probation.661
Sikeo v. State
In Sikeo v. State,662 the court of appeals held that a presumptive 99-year sentence for a
defendant who is convicted of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, and who has two
prior convictions for sexual felonies, is not cruel and unusual.663 Sikeo was convicted of
first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.664 Because of his two prior convictions for seconddegree sexual abuse of a minor, Sikeo faced a 99-year presumptive sentence.665 He
received the presumptive sentence and appealed, arguing that the presumptive sentence
was cruel and unusual.666 The court of appeals reasoned that, compared to the mandatory
99-year sentence for defendants convicted of a class A or unclassified felony, who also
have two prior, similar convictions, the presumptive term for sexual felons is not cruel
and unusual.667 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a presumptive 99-year sentence
for a defendant who is convicted of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, and who has
two prior convictions for sexual felonies, is not cruel and unusual.668
Pierce v. State
In Pierce v. State,669 the court of appeals held that, to preserve an issue for appeal, a party
must first provide case-specific legal and factual analysis to the trial court, and the trial
judge must rule upon the issue.670 Pierce was charged with robbery, theft, and assault.671
At a pretrial hearing, Pierce asserted that a witness’s identification of him was
impermissibly unreliable and should be excluded.672 However, when it came time to
explain why the testimony should be excluded, Pierce’s attorney did not provide a factual
657

Id.
Id.
659
Id.
660
Id.
661
Id. at 236.
662
258 P.3d 906 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
663
Id. at 912.
664
Id. at 907.
665
Id.
666
Id. at 908–09.
667
Id. at 912.
668
Id.
669
261 P.3d 428 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
670
Id. at 435.
671
Id. at 429.
672
Id.
658

46

or legal analysis of the issue.673 Pierce’s attorney filed a motion that told the superior
court that she intended to seek suppression of the witness’s identification, but the motion
contained no discussion of the facts or the legal tests for suppressing witness
identification.674 The trial court never ruled on the motion.675 For these reasons, the court
of appeals determined that the issue had not been properly raised in the superior court. 676
The court of appeals held that, to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must first provide
case-specific legal and factual analysis to the trial court, and the trial judge must rule
upon the issue.677
Fletcher v. State
In Fletcher v. State,678 the court of appeals held that a minor waives her right to contest
her juvenile waiver proceeding when she enters a plea of no contest.679 After concluding
that Fletcher, who faced murder charges, would be unamenable to treatment, the superior
court waived juvenile jurisdiction over her.680 Fletcher then pled no contest to her
charges.681 Decades later, she filed an application for post-conviction relief alleging that
new developments in juvenile brain research could have convinced the trial court to deny
the State’s motion to waive juvenile jurisdiction.682 The court of appeals affirmed the
superior court’s order dismissing her application, reasoning that jurisdiction over a minor
is more akin to personal jurisdiction than to subject-matter jurisdiction because the
superior court has jurisdiction over both juvenile and adult felony prosecutions.683
Entering a plea of guilty or no contest waives certain defects of previous proceedings,
including personal jurisdiction.684 The court of appeals held that a minor waives her right
to contest her juvenile waiver proceeding when she enters a plea of no contest.685
Carney v. State
In Carney v. State,686 the court of appeals held that a suspect’s confession to police
officers can be voluntary, even if the officers promise not to arrest the confessor in return
for the confession, so long as the confessor does not actually believe the officers.687
Officers asked Carney, who had substantial experience with the criminal justice system,
to come to the police station so they could interview him about a recent murder.688
Throughout Carney’s confession, police officers stated that he would not be arrested that
day; but Carney, who seemed to assume that his arrest was imminent, informed one of
673
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the officers that, if he should be arrested, he wanted that particular officer to arrest him.689
Carney stated that prior to his arrest, he could not sleep because he anticipated being
arrested, and he did not object when the officers came to arrest him.690 At trial, Carney
moved to suppress his confession, arguing that it had been made involuntarily.691 The
trial court denied his motion and Carney appealed.692 The court of appeals reasoned that
Carney’s confession had not been influenced by the officers’ promises.693 The court
determined that Carney had not believed that the officers had offered him immunity in
exchange for his statement.694 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a suspect’s
confession to police can be voluntary, even if the officers promise not to arrest the
suspect in return for his confession, so long as the suspect does not actually believe the
officers.695
State v. Amend
In State v. Amend,696 the court of appeals held that a single validly-obtained Miranda
waiver is sufficient to make a suspect’s statements admissible in court, even if the police
change the subject matter of the questioning.697 Amend was arrested for shoplifting and
advised of his Miranda rights.698 During the arrest, Amend agreed to a search of his
pockets, in which the police officer found OxyContin tablets.699 Amend then made
several incriminating statements about selling OxyContin.700 The superior court held that
Amend’s statements about the OxyContin to the police officer had to be suppressed
because the officer had failed to remind Amend of his Miranda rights.701 The court of
appeals reasoned that the U.S. Constitution did not require suppression of the statements
and that Amend’s case presented no compelling reasons to require a stricter waiver
process under the Alaska Constitution.702 Reversing, the court of appeals held that a
single validly-obtained Miranda waiver is sufficient to make a suspect’s statements
admissible in court, even if the police change the subject matter of the questioning.703
State v. Cook
In State v. Cook,704 the court of appeals held that when, as the result of a mistake, a court
in a civil case freezes the assets of a defendant who is also facing a criminal trial, that
mistake does not violate the defendant’s right to the counsel of his choice.705 Cook was
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prosecuted for murder and was simultaneously sued for wrongful death.706 Cook did not
respond to the civil suit; as a result, the superior court entered a default judgment against
him and froze his assets.707 When Cook finally responded to the civil suit, the superior
court refused to set aside the judgment.708 Because his assets were frozen at the time of
his criminal trial, he was unable to obtain the lawyer of his choice and was instead
represented by the Public Defender Agency.709 He was convicted of murder.710 Later, the
supreme court held that the superior court should have granted Cook’s request to set aside
the default in his civil case.711 Cook petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing that,
because the superior court’s error had prevented him from obtaining the counsel of his
choice, he was entitled to a new trial.712 The petition was granted, and the State
appealed.713 The court of appeals questioned whether the superior court’s mistake should
be viewed as a wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, Cook’s right to hire the
defense counsel of his choice.714 The court noted that there would not have even been an
argument of a Sixth Amendment violation if the supreme court had determined that the
superior court had properly refused to reopen the civil case.715 The court then reasoned
that, under Cook’s theory, any criminal conviction could be overturned whenever the
defendant faced a simultaneous civil suit in which a court committed procedural error.716
Reversing, the court of appeals held that when, as the result of a mistake, a court in a civil
case freezes the assets of a defendant who is also facing a criminal trial, that mistake does
not violate the defendant’s right to the counsel of his choice.717
Olson v. State
In Olson v. State,718 the court of appeals held that a Miranda waiver can be valid when
the suspect acknowledges that he understands his Miranda rights and immediately
volunteers information, including information that has not been requested. 719 Olson was
arrested for domestic violence.720 In the squad car, the officer advised Olson of his
Miranda rights and Olson acknowledged that he understood those rights.721 He made
several incriminating statements—some of which were not in response to questioning—
and then invoked his right to silence.722 The superior court held that he had knowingly
waived his right to silence and that the statements were therefore admissible.723 On
706

Id. at 343.
Id. at 343–44.
708
Id. at 344.
709
Id.
710
Id.
711
Id.
712
Id.
713
Id. at 345.
714
Id. at 346.
715
Id.
716
Id.
717
Id. at 347–48.
718
262 P.3d 227 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
719
Id. at 231.
720
Id. at 229.
721
Id.
722
Id. at 229–30.
723
Id. at 230.
707

49

appeal, Olson argued that he had not voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights.724
The court of appeals acknowledged that, under federal law, a suspect waives his Miranda
rights if he makes an uncoerced statement to the police.725 But the court did not have to
decide whether Alaska would adopt the federal standard because the totality of the
circumstances supported a finding that Olson understood his rights and voluntarily
waived them.726 The court of appeals held that a Miranda waiver can be valid when the
suspect acknowledges that he understands his Miranda rights and immediately volunteers
information, including information that has not been requested.727
Anderson v. State
In Anderson v. State,728 the court of appeals held that an individual can validly consent to
provide blood and urine samples, even when an officer has erroneously told him that he
must provide the samples, so long as he has consulted with his attorney. 729 After hitting
and killing a pedestrian with his car, police told Anderson that he was required by law to
provide blood and urine samples.730 Anderson discussed the matter with his attorney and
eventually provided the samples.731 Anderson filed a motion to suppress the results of the
samples, arguing that he had not had a meaningful conversation with his attorney; his
motion was denied and he was convicted of driving under the influence.732 The court of
appeals reasoned that Anderson’s consent was voluntary because he had discussed the
issue with his lawyer and because he had been given forty minutes to reflect on the
decision prior to his consent.733 The court noted that, although the detaining officer had
incorrectly asserted that the samples were required, the misrepresentation was not
intentional.734 And because Anderson refused to provide the samples until he had
consulted with his lawyer, the court concluded that Anderson’s consent was not tainted
by the officer’s incorrect assertion of authority.735 Affirming, the court of appeals held
that an individual can validly consent to provide blood and urine samples, even when an
officer has erroneously told him that he must provide the samples, so long as he has
consulted with his attorney.736
Nook v. State
In Nook v. State,737 the court of appeals held that a convicted defendant whose lawyer is
retroactively transferred to inactive status must show that he was unfairly prejudiced by
his lawyer’s representation to prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim.738 In 1999,
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Nook was found guilty of second-degree murder.739 In 2003, the supreme court
transferred his counsel to inactive disability status.740 The inactive status extended
retroactively to 1998, prior to Nook’s trial.741 Nook then filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing that, because Sidell was technically inactive during his
representation of Nook, Nook had been denied his right to effective assistance of
counsel.742 The superior court denied the application.743 The court of appeals reasoned
that, absent a situation where an attorney knows at the time of representation that he is
barred from representing clients, his client must still prove specific acts of attorney
incompetence and resulting prejudice to win an ineffective-assistance claim.744 To hold
otherwise would permit Nook to obtain a new trial when, at the time of his original trial,
even the most probing inquiry would not have revealed any defect in his lawyer’s ability
to practice law.745 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that a convicted defendant
whose lawyer is retroactively transferred to inactive status must show that he was
unfairly prejudiced by his lawyer’s representation to prevail on an ineffective-assistance
claim.746
ELECTION LAW
top
N/A
EMPLOYMENT LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Cameron v. Chang-Craft
In Cameron v. Chang-Craft,747 the supreme court held that a jury can reasonably find that
a union breaches its duty of fair representation when a former employee’s wrongfultermination grievance has merit but the union withdraws from arbitration without
explanation.748 Chang-Craft asked her union to reconsider her wrongful termination
grievance against her employer because she had no previous disciplinary issues with her
employer, the allegations against her were exaggerated and taken out of context, and she
had been denied a union representative at the investigatory meeting. 749 The union did not
respond and offered no reason for its decision not to proceed with the grievance.750
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Chang-Craft sued and a jury found that the union had violated its duty of fair
representation by arbitrary refusing to represent her.751 On appeal, the supreme court
reasoned that, because Chang-Craft had a meritorious argument, and because the union
had failed to provide any explanation for its failure to pursue her claim, the evidence was
sufficient for a jury to conclude that its decision was arbitrary.752 Affirming, the supreme
court held that a jury can reasonably find that a union breaches its duty of fair
representation when a former employee’s wrongful-termination grievance has merit but
the union withdraws from arbitration without explanation.753
State v. Public Safety Employees Ass’n
In State v. Public Safety Employees Ass’n,754 the supreme court announced that it is
improper for a court to enforce an arbitration decision that violates an explicit, welldefined, and dominant public policy.755 The Public Safety Employees Association filed a
grievance on behalf of a state trooper who had been dismissed in part for dishonesty
during training exercises. 756 The trooper had been told that his dishonesty would result
in nothing more than a minor suspension, but his termination letter focused on that
dishonesty.757 Since the other incidents reported in the termination letter did not
constitute a pattern of dishonesty, the arbitrator determined that the State lacked just
cause for the termination and reinstated the trooper.758 The superior court upheld the
arbitration award and the State appealed.759 Noting that other jurisdictions have
recognized the public-policy exception to the enforcement of arbitration awards, the
supreme court adopted such an exception for awards that would violate an explicit, welldefined, and dominant public policy in Alaska.760 The court nevertheless upheld the
arbitrator’s reinstatement of the trooper because the State was unable to identify a source
that clearly set out a public policy regarding the reinstatement of a trooper who has been
dishonest.761 Thus, the Court upheld the arbitration award but announced that it is
improper for a court to enforce an arbitration decision that violates an explicit, welldefined, and dominant public policy.762
Hoendermis v. Advanced Physical Therapy
In Hoendermis v. Advanced Physical Therapy,763 the supreme court held that the denial
of an unemployment benefits claim does not collaterally estop an employee from suing
her former employer for wrongful termination.764 Hoendermis was an employee of
Advanced Physical Therapy (APT) until she was fired for poor interaction with other
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employees.765 Hoendermis applied for unemployment benefits, but her claim was denied
because she had been terminated for misconduct.766 She then sued APT for wrongful
termination.767 The trial court granted APT’s motion for summary judgment, holding that
the agency’s determination collaterally estopped Hoendermis from suing APT.768 On
appeal, the supreme court reasoned that, although agency decisions can sometimes
collaterally estop claims, here the agency’s decision was related only to Hoendermis’
eligibility for benefits and not to the culpability of her former employer.769 Reversing, the
supreme court held that the denial of an unemployment benefits claim does not
collaterally estop an employee from suing her former employer for wrongful
termination.770
Crowley v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Crowley v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,771 the supreme court held
that, to prove a breach of the subjective component of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, a terminated employee must show that her employer acted in bad
faith.772 Crowley was discharged from employment after an internal investigation
revealed numerous instances of incompetence and poor judgment.773 Crowley sued,
alleging wrongful termination under the theory that her employer had violated the
subjective component of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.774 The
superior court dismissed the case, and Crowley appealed.775 The supreme court noted that
the only evidence Crowley had presented to prove that the internal investigation had been
conducted in bad faith was her own speculation.776 And even if Crowley could have
proven that her employer had been mistaken as to the underlying facts leading to her
termination, such proof would not have shown that her employer had acted in bad
faith.777 Affirming, the supreme court held that, to prove a breach of the subjective
component of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a terminated employee
must show that her employer acted in bad faith.778
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. Federal Highway Administration
In Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. Federal Highway Administration,779 the
Ninth Circuit held that an agency violates the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) when its environmental impact statement fails to adequately address a
reasonable alternative to a proposed project.780 The Alaska Department of Transportation,
in connection with the Federal Highway Administration, initiated a project to improve
the surface access from Juneau to Haines and Skagway.781 The Highway Administration
released for public comment a draft environmental impact statement in which it
announced that its preferred method of improving surface access was to build a new
highway and a new ferry terminal.782 In a comment letter, the Southeast Alaska
Conservation Council (Council) asserted that the draft impact statement violated NEPA
because it did not consider that surface access could be improved by improving the ferry
systems already in place in the Lynn Canal corridor.783 The Highway Administration
issued a final impact statement in which it rejected the Council’s suggestion, stating
simply that it could not increase ferry service there without reducing service elsewhere
and without increasing costs.784 The Council sought an injunction in the district court.785
The district court held that the Highway Administration violated NEPA when, in its
impact statement, it arbitrarily refused to consider a reasonable alternative to its
project.786 In so holding, the district court enjoined any construction on the project.787 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that, under NEPA, an agency must objectively evaluate
any reasonable alternatives to a proposed action.788 The Highway Administration had
failed to adequately consider the Council’s alternative under NEPA. 789 Further, the
Highway Administration’s reason for dismissing the Council’s argument—that the
Council’s plan would take ferry service away from other areas and that it would increase
costs—was arbitrary, because the Highway Administration’s adopted plan would create
the same problems.790 Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that an agency violates NEPA
when its environmental impact statement fails to adequately address a reasonable
alternative to a proposed project.791
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United States District Court for the District of Alaska
Organized Village of Kake v. U.S. Department of Agriculture
In Organized Village of Kake v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,792 the federal district
court held that the promulgation of the Forest Service rule exempting the Tongass
National Forest from the Roadless Area Conservation Rule was arbitrary and
capricious.793 The Forest Service gave three reasons for its promulgation of a rule
temporarily exempting the Tongass from the Roadless Rule: (1) the long-term
socioeconomic costs to local communities of applying the Roadless Rule to the Tongass
would be too great; (2) the Tongass Forest Plan sufficiently protected the roadless values
on the Tongass; and (3) the temporary exemption would provide legal certainty in light of
numerous lawsuits regarding the Roadless Rule.794 Individuals who used and relied on
the Tongass roadless area challenged the rule.795 The court analyzed whether the reasons
offered by the Forest Service for the exemption provided a rational basis for the
temporary exemption.796 First, the court reasoned that it was implausible to use long-term
socioeconomic projections to justify a short-term exemption; moreover, the Forest
Service had not offered any evidence showing actual job losses resulting from the
application of the Roadless Rule.797 Second, the court noted that the Forest Service had
flipped positions—without explanation—by first maintaining that the Forest Plan did not
provide enough protection to the Tongass, then maintaining that it did.798 Furthermore,
the Ninth Circuit had already stated that the Roadless Rule provided greater protection to
roadless areas than did the forest plans.799 Finally, the court reasoned that it was
implausible that a temporary exemption, during which the Forest Service would engage
in further rulemaking, could provide any legal certainty.800 Reinstating the Roadless Rule,
the federal district court held that the promulgation of the Forest Service rule exempting
the Tongass National Forest from the Roadless Area Conservation Rule was arbitrary and
capricious.801
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
top
Alaska Court of Appeals
State v. Dussault
In State v. Dussault,802 the court of appeals held that a judge who has significant ex parte
communications about a case, without express legal authorization and without
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immediately notifying the missing parties, must be disqualified from the case.803 Dussault
was civilly committed after being acquitted of first-degree murder by reason of
insanity.804 During conditional-release hearings, the superior court judge had numerous
ex parte conversations with Department of Health and Social Services officials in an
attempt to gain conditional release for Dussault.805 The State moved to disqualify the
judge; when the judge denied the State’s motion, the State appealed.806 The court of
appeals noted that the ex parte conversations had not been expressly authorized by law,
nor had they been required for administrative purposes.807 Furthermore, the court noted
that the superior court judge failed to immediately notify the missing parties of his ex
parte communications.808 Under these circumstances, the court determined that the ex
parte communications created an appearance of partiality and that the superior court
judge had to be disqualified from the case.809 Reversing, the court of appeals held that a
judge who has significant ex parte communications about a case, without express legal
authorization and without immediately notifying the missing parties, must be disqualified
from the case.810
FAMILY LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Heustess v. Kelley-Heustess
In Heustess v. Kelley-Heustess,811 the supreme court held that, during a child’s minority,
the statute of limitations for child support is tolled.812 The parents had a son in 1991.813
The father failed to financially support the child until 1997.814 During divorce
proceedings, the superior court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the mother’s
claim for pre-1997 child support.815 The supreme court affirmed because (1) the statute of
limitations in Alaska expires ten years after the cause of action; (2) when a claim belongs
to a child, the time that the child is under the age of majority does not count against the
statute of limitations; and (3) in Alaska, the right to child support is the child’s right.816
Affirming, the supreme court held that, during a child’s minority, the statute of
limitations for child support is tolled.817
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Darcy F. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Darcy F. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,818 the supreme court held
that not every possible active effort must be provided by the Office of Children’s
Services (OCS) to a parent before parental rights can be terminated.819 Darcy had a
history of severe chronic pain and other medical problems that led to substance abuse.820
The superior court terminated Darcy’s parental rights to her daughter because she was not
capable of meeting the child’s needs.821 On appeal, Darcy argued that the State had made
insufficient efforts to address the medical conditions underlying her substance abuse.822
The supreme court reasoned that OCS had done enough, even if there was more that OCS
could have done.823 The court noted that active efforts made by OCS included:
(1) developing a case plan for Darcy that identified specific concerns, and offering
services to address those concerns; (2) repeatedly following up on Darcy’s case plan;
(3) numerous efforts to arrange for substance abuse assessments, drug tests, and
treatments; and (4) continued monitoring of Darcy’s progress up to the beginning of the
hearings.824 Affirming, the supreme court held that not every possible active effort must
be provided by OCS to a parent before parental rights can be terminated.825
Christina J. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Christina J. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,826 the supreme court
held that when a child is taken by the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) soon after
birth, termination of parental rights may occur earlier than usual due to the importance of
bonding and permanence for young children.827 Christina appealed from the termination
of her parental rights to her son.828 Her son had been exposed to substance abuse,
domestic violence, and his parents’ mental health instability.829 OCS took custody of him
four months after his birth and petitioned for the termination of parental rights nine
months after his birth.830 The lower court upheld the termination of parental rights,
finding that Christina had done virtually nothing to remedy her behavior. 831 The supreme
court affirmed, holding that the child’s young age and the slow pace of Christina’s
attempted recovery were significant factors when determining whether to terminate
parental rights.832 The court noted that, because of the child’s young age, it was important
for OCS to find a permanent, stable family for him so that he could appropriately bond
with a parental figure.833 Affirming, the supreme court held that when a child is taken by
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OCS soon after birth, termination of parental rights may occur earlier than usual due to
the importance of bonding and permanence for young children.834
William P. v. Taunya P.
In William P. v. Taunya P.,835 the supreme court held that a trial court does not abuse its
discretion by limiting a father’s visitation rights due to the father’s denigrating the mother
in front of their children.836 William and Taunya were a divorced couple with two sons.837
Taunya moved out of state, requiring modification of the couple’s child custody
arrangement.838 The trial court granted sole custody to Taunya and shortened William’s
visitation rights to one week at Christmas and six weeks during the summer.839 William
appealed the order, arguing that the reduction was unwarranted given that the experts in
the case recommended no reduction in visitation.840 The supreme court reasoned that
William had harmed the boys’ relationship with their mother by repeatedly denigrating
Taunya in front of them. The court also noted that the superior court would revisit the
issue if William later ceased such denigration.841 The court emphasized that one factor—
the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and
continuing relationship between the other parent and the children—is the most important
factor when parents reside at a great distance apart.842 Affirming, the supreme court held
that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by limiting a father’s visitation rights due to
the father’s denigrating the mother in front of their children.843
Bagby v. Bagby
In Bagby v. Bagby,844 the supreme court held that a father’s relocation with his child out
of state constitutes a substantial change in circumstances warranting a determination of
whether modification of the child custody agreement would better serve the child’s best
interests, even if the parents had previously lived far apart within Alaska.845 The superior
court denied the mother’s motion to modify custody after the father, who had primary
custody, moved with their daughter to Arizona.846 The superior court found that the
father’s move to Arizona did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances because
the original custody order had included long-distance travel between Sitka and
Anchorage.847 After examining state precedent and evaluating the considerable obstacles
involved in interstate traveling, the supreme court reversed and held that a father’s
relocation with his child out of state constitutes a substantial change in circumstances
warranting a determination of whether modification of the child custody agreement
834
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would better serve the child’s best interests, even if the parents had previously lived far
apart within Alaska.848
Ralph H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Ralph H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,849 the supreme court held
that a parent’s compliance with a treatment program does not guarantee that parental
rights will not be terminated.850 Ralph attended a family violence intervention program
but later threatened to kill a social worker if his son, Rex, was not returned to him.851 The
superior court found that Ralph had not remedied the conduct or condition that made Rex
a child in need of aid.852 On appeal, Ralph argued that he had substantially complied with
his treatment plan and, thus, Rex was not a child in need of aid.853 The supreme court
noted that a treatment program does not guarantee that adequate parenting skills will be
acquired by completing the program.854 Further, sufficient evidence existed in the record
to support the superior court’s finding that Ralph had not remedied the conduct and
conditions that had placed Rex at a substantial risk of harm.855 Affirming, the supreme
court held that a parent’s compliance with a treatment program does not guarantee that
parental rights will not be terminated.856
Yvonne S. v. Wesley H.
In Yvonne S. v. Wesley H.,857 the supreme court held that a marked drop in a child’s
academic performance does not necessarily demonstrate a change of circumstances
warranting modification of a custody arrangement.858 Yvonne and Wesley divorced and
Wesley was given primary physical custody of their daughter.859 Two years later, Yvonne
moved for a hearing for shared physical custody because their daughter’s grades had
deteriorated during the time that she lived primarily with Wesley.860 The lower court
denied the motion, stating that Yvonne had not demonstrated a substantial change in
circumstances.861 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that although the daughter’s
grades had dropped markedly, the drop could be attributed to numerous causes (such as
harder classes).862 The court also noted that the daughter strongly preferred to live with
Wesley.863 The supreme court affirmed and held that a marked drop in a child’s academic
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performance does not necessarily demonstrate a change of circumstances warranting
modification of a custody arrangement.864
Ralph H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Ralph H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,865 the supreme court held
that, when parental rights have been terminated, post-termination visitation rights should
not be granted if visitation is not in the best interest of the child. 866 The superior court
terminated Ralph’s parental rights after a Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceeding.867
Ralph then moved for post-termination visitation privileges with his child and, at a
hearing, a doctor testified that it would be in the child’s best interest to continue a
relationship with Ralph.868 The superior court denied Ralph’s motion without prejudice,
finding that Ralph had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that granting him
visitation rights would be in his child’s best interest.869 On appeal, the supreme court first
noted that a termination of parental rights results in automatic cessation of visitation and
that no CINA statute expressly grants a superior court the authority to order posttermination visitation rights.870 But, the supreme court noted, the possibility of posttermination visitation is not completely foreclosed; extraordinary circumstances might
permit a superior court to order such visitation, if visitation would be in the best interest
of the child.871 After reviewing the record, the supreme court determined that the superior
court had not clearly erred in its denial of post-termination visitation rights.872 First, the
supreme court reasoned that the child would benefit from a sense of permanency that
could only be achieved through adoption.873 Second, it noted that conflicting evidence
had been presented to the superior court as to whether visitation would be beneficial or
harmful to the child.874 The supreme court thus held that, when parental rights have been
terminated, post-termination visitation rights should not be granted if visitation is not in
the best interest of the child.875
McAlpine v. Pacarro
In McAlpine v. Pacarro,876 the supreme court held that, although res judicata does not
apply to custody disputes, collateral estoppel may bar a litigant from twice arguing that
prior domestic violence should influence a custody decision.877 McAlpine and Pacarro
divorced and McAlpine moved for a long-term domestic violence protective order against
Pacarro.878 The superior court found that there was no evidence of domestic violence.879
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Two years later, McAlpine sought to obtain custody of their children and again asserted
that Pacarro’s prior domestic violence should influence the custody decision.880 The
superior court denied her motion without a hearing, holding that the motion was barred
by res judicata and collateral estoppel.881 On appeal, the supreme court noted that res
judicata does not apply to custody modifications.882 A change in circumstances must
normally be demonstrated to obtain a custody modification, but that rule is relaxed when
domestic violence is an issue—especially if the custody agreement was made by pro se
parties with a history of domestic violence.883 The court reasoned, however, that the
superior court judge had discretion to apply collateral estoppel to bar McAlpine’s claim
because: (1) she was a party to the first action, (2) the issue that she raised was identical
to the issue already decided, (3) a final judgment on the merits had been issued, and
(4) the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment. 884 Because the
superior court did not discuss whether it would be fair to apply collateral estoppel to
McAlpine’s claim, the supreme court remanded and held that, although res judicata does
not apply to custody disputes, collateral estoppel may bar a litigant from twice arguing
that prior domestic violence should influence a custody decision.885
Nelson v. Nelson
In Nelson v. Nelson,886 the supreme court held that a move out of state constitutes a
change of circumstances sufficient to modify a custody agreement, even when the parties
had agreed upon a custody arrangement if one of the parents moved out of the state.887
When Justin and Erica divorced, they agreed that, if one of them moved out of their
community, their children would remain with the non-moving parent until both parents
created a parenting agreement for the different communities.888 Both parents later
contemplated moving out of state and both parents moved for primary custody, arguing
that moving out of state would constitute a change of circumstances. 889 The superior
court held that there had been no unanticipated change of circumstances because both
parents had contemplated moving out of state at the time of their original custody
agreement.890 Justin appealed, arguing that his anticipated move constituted a change of
circumstances.891 The supreme court reasoned that an anticipated move satisfies the
change-of-circumstances requirement and that to hold otherwise could result in a custody
award to an unfit parent solely because that parent had not moved away. 892 The existing
custody agreement could be taken into account by the superior court, but the superior
court could not enforce the agreement unless the court agreed that the terms of the
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agreement were also in the best interest of the child.893 The supreme court held that a
move out of state constitutes a change of circumstances sufficient to modify a custody
agreement, even when the parties had agreed upon a custody arrangement if one of the
parents moved out of the state.894
Sarah G. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Sarah G. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,895 the supreme court held
that a parent’s tendency to expose her children to an environment filled with domestic
violence can be used to support a judgment that her child is in need of aid.896 The Office
of Children’s Services (OCS) removed Sarah’s children after receiving reports that
Sarah’s boyfriend had assaulted her in the home and that her children did not feel safe
there.897 The superior court determined that the children were in need of aid due to their
mental injury and substance abuse, as well as their mother’s mental illness and her failure
to provide them with treatment and supervision.898 In so holding, the superior court found
that Sarah had a “continued tendency” to enter physically abusive relationships, thus
creating a substantial risk of mental injury to her children. 899 On appeal, Sarah argued
that the court’s finding would compel the conclusion that any woman who fails to sever
contact with an abusive partner would show a “continued tendency” to enter abusive
relationships.900 The supreme court noted that no evidence at trial supported a finding that
Sarah had ever had a nonviolent relationship.901 The court reasoned that, because the
children had lived their lives in the shadow of domestic violence, Sarah had exposed
them to a substantial risk of mental injury.902 Affirming, the supreme court held that a
parent’s tendency to expose her children to an environment filled with domestic violence
can be used to support a judgment that her child is in need of aid.903
INSURANCE LAW
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Herron
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Herron,904 the Ninth Circuit held that the failure of an insurer
to determine by a date certain whether the insured’s liability exceeds his policy limit does
not necessarily result in a violation of the Alaska covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
even when the insurer has the ability to do so.905 Herron was involved in a car accident in
893
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which his passenger was injured.906 The passenger’s lawyer contacted Allstate and stated
that it would revoke an offer to settle at policy limits by May 16, 2003.907 On that day,
Allstate stated that it was still investigating the accident and would respond to the
settlement offer by the end of May.908 On May 30, Allstate offered to settle for the policy
limit, but the offer was rejected because Allstate had not met the May 16 deadline.909
Allstate sought a declaratory judgment that its attempt to settle satisfied its obligation to
Herron and that it would not be obligated to pay any amount exceeding the policy
limit.910 The parties stipulated that Allstate could have determined that Herron’s liability
exceeded his policy limits by May 16, but a jury found that Allstate had acted
reasonably.911 Herron appealed, arguing that the Alaska covenant of good faith and fair
dealing required Allstate to settle by May 16.912 Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Allstate, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it was not clear that Allstate had
unreasonably failed to settle by May 16.913 The court noted that, although the parties had
stipulated that Allstate could have determined Herron’s liability by May 16, the question
before the jury was whether Allstate should have settled by then.914 Affirming, the Ninth
Circuit held that the failure of an insurer to determine by a date certain whether the
insured’s liability exceeds his policy limit does not necessarily result in a violation of the
Alaska covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even when the insurer has the ability to
do so.915
Alaska Supreme Court
State, Department of Commerce v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
In State, Department of Commerce v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,916 the supreme court
held that a non-construction, owner-controlled insurance program is not barred by
AS 21.36.065.917 Alyeska Pipeline Service Company contracted with Liberty Mutual to
write an owner-controlled insurance program.918 The contractors enrolled in that program
engaged in maintenance and support, not construction.919 The State issued a cease-anddesist order, claiming that the owner-controlled insurance program violated
AS 21.36.065.920 The superior court held that the company had not violated the statute.921
On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that the definitions provided in AS 21.36.065(c)
clearly restrict AS 21.36.065 to insurance programs that are procured on behalf of a
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person who, in the course of the person’s business, engages the service of a contractor for
the purpose of working on a construction project.922 The court noted that the statute’s
language is so clear that it is unsusceptible to any other interpretation, even though the
legislature arguably intended the statute to apply more broadly.923 Affirming, the supreme
court held that a non-construction, owner-controlled insurance program is not barred by
AS 21.36.065.924
Whitney v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co.
In Whitney v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co.,925 the supreme court held that an
insurance company does not breach its duty of care toward a policy holder by declining
to settle a lawsuit against him for more than the upper limit covered by his policy.926
Whitney injured Giannechini in a traffic accident.927 Giannechini offered to settle all
claims; Whitney’s insurer, State Farm, responded that it would be willing to settle for the
maximum amount covered by Whitney’s policy. 928 Giannechini refused and sued.929
Whitney later sued State Farm, alleging that it had acted in bad faith and violated the duty
of care owed to him by failing to settle.930 The trial court entered summary judgment in
favor of State Farm.931 On appeal, the supreme court noted that all insurance contracts
contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, including a duty to accept
reasonable offers of settlement promptly.932 Here, that duty was not triggered because
Giannechini’s settlement offer was higher than the policy limit.933 Affirming, the
supreme court held that an insurance company does not breach its duty of care toward a
policy holder by declining to settle a lawsuit against him for more than the upper limit
covered by his policy.934
NATIVE LAW
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Blatchford v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium
In Blatchford v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium,935 the Ninth Circuit held that
the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA) provides a tribal organization with a
right of recovery for health care services only against third parties and not against the
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health care recipient.936 Blatchford was injured in a car accident and received free health
care services from the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium (ANTHC).937 ANTHC
filed a lien against Blatchford for any money that she might receive from third parties
related to the injuries for which ANTHC had treated her.938 Blatchford then received a
settlement from her insurer and sought a declaratory judgment that the ANTHC’s liens
were not valid under IHCIA; ANTHC filed a counterclaim for payment of the money
Blatchford had received.939 The district court granted summary judgment to ANTHC.940
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the title of the Act’s applicable section reads:
“[r]eimbursement from certain third parties of costs and health services.”941 That section
also contained another phrase implying that the statute only permits the health care
provider to stand in the shoes of the health care recipient. 942 The court reasoned that
Congress enacted the statute to permit recovery from third parties because health care
recipients would not be strongly inclined to seek remuneration for health care costs that
were obtained for free.943 Reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that IHCIA provides a tribal
organization with a right of recovery for health care services only against third parties
and not against the health care recipient.944
Alaska Supreme Court
McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Village
In McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Village,945 the supreme court reaffirmed its previous decision
that Alaska Native Tribes on the Department of the Interior’s list of federally recognized
tribes are sovereign entities.946 Ivanof Bay Village contracted with McCrary to oversee its
economic planning and development.947 When Ivanof Bay refused to pay expenses
McCrary had incurred as part of the contract, McCrary sued.948 The superior court
dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the tribe was
federally recognized and thus protected by sovereign immunity. 949 On appeal, McCrary
argued that, although John v. Baker950 held that Alaska Native Tribes on the Department
of the Interior’s list of federally recognized tribes are sovereign entities, the supreme
court’s holding in that case should have no precedential value because no party in John v.
Baker had argued against the position taken by the court.951 The court noted that its
previous decision had been well-reasoned and, further, that it had never been called into
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question by commentators, by Congress, or by other courts.952 The supreme court
reaffirmed its previous decision that Alaska Native Tribes on the Department of the
Interior’s list of federally recognized tribes are sovereign entities.953
State v. Native Village of Tanana
In State v. Native Village of Tanana,954 the supreme court held that federally recognized
Alaska Native tribes that have not reassumed exclusive jurisdiction over child custody
proceedings under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) still have concurrent
jurisdiction to initiate child custody proceedings both inside and outside of Indian
country.955 The State Attorney General issued an opinion stating that Alaska state courts
had exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving Alaska Native
children unless the child’s tribe successfully petitioned the Department of Interior for
jurisdiction under ICWA or a state superior court transferred the case to a tribal court.956
The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) then created guidelines severely limiting the
amount of information it would give to a tribe about any investigations conducted by
OCS, and the Bureau of Vital Statistics began refusing to accept tribal court adoption
paperwork.957 Several tribes sought a declaratory judgment that they had inherent and
concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate children’s proceedings.958 The superior court granted
the tribes’ requested relief; the State appealed, arguing that ICWA provided a complete
jurisdictional scheme limiting the ability of the tribes to initiate child custody
proceedings.959 Four considerations led the court to believe that the tribes have
concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate child custody matters: (1) a federally recognized
tribe has inherent authority to regulate internal domestic relations unless Congress has
divested it of that authority; (2) the elimination of nearly all Indian country under the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act did not divest the tribes of their authority to
regulate internal domestic relations; (3) ambiguities in statutes affecting the rights of
Native Americans must be resolved in favor of the Native Americans; (4) in enacting
ICWA, Congress intended to allow tribes to adjudicate child custody matters.960
Affirming, the supreme court held that federally recognized Alaska Native tribes that
have not reassumed exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings under ICWA
still have concurrent jurisdiction to initiate child custody proceedings both inside and
outside of Indian country.961
Bruce L. v. W.E.
In Bruce L. v. W.E.,962 the supreme court held that a father can sufficiently acknowledge
paternity of his son to qualify as a parent under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
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even if the father does not comply with the Alaska legitimation statute.963 The superior
court upheld an adoption decree and termination of Bruce’s parental rights after he failed
to establish paternity within one year of his child’s birth in accordance with state law. 964
On appeal, Bruce argued that since his son is an Indian child, termination of parental
rights was subject to the higher ICWA evidentiary standard rather than the state law
standard.965 The prospective adoptive parents argued that Bruce’s unwed status, in
conjunction with his delay in establishing paternity, precluded ICWA’s application.966
The court noted that Bruce had filed an acknowledgment of paternity with the superior
court in the first adoption proceeding, that he had moved for custody and paternity
testing, and that he had filed a separate suit for custody of his son.967 The supreme court
vacated the trial court’s termination of Bruce’s parental rights and held that a father can
sufficiently acknowledge paternity of his son to qualify as a parent under ICWA even if
he does not comply with the Alaska legitimation statute.968
Pravat P. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Pravat P. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,969 the supreme court held
that, to satisfy the “active efforts” requirement of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),
the efforts of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) must cross the threshold from
passive to active, and a parent’s lack of cooperation can excuse minor faults on the part
of OCS.970 While Pravat was incarcerated for assaulting the mother of one of his children,
OCS contacted him but did not start a case plan because Pravat, who was Laotian, spoke
limited English and had bilateral hearing loss.971 OCS supervised meetings between
Pravat and his children but delayed reunification efforts until Pravat could obtain a
psychological assessment (which took over a year due to Pravat’s language and hearing
issues).972 OCS obtained an interpreter for family therapy meetings, obtained a hearing
aid for Pravat, and reached out to Laotian and Thai temples for assistance in teaching
parenting skills to Pravat.973 Pravat was uncooperative with treatment and OCS moved to
terminate his parental rights.974 In terminating Pravat’s parental rights, the superior court
held that OCS had made “active efforts,” as required by ICWA, to prevent the breakup of
Pravat’s family.975 On appeal, Pravat argued that OCS undermined his chances of
reunification by failing to provide cultural continuity, failing to provide parenting
modeling, and inappropriately delaying its efforts, thus violating its duty to make active
efforts to prevent the breakup of his family.976 The supreme court noted that OCS is not
required to be perfect to satisfy the “active efforts” requirement of ICWA; OCS’s efforts
963
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merely need to cross the threshold from passive to active.977 Further, the court noted, a
parent’s lack of cooperation can excuse minor faults on OCS’s part. 978 Affirming, the
supreme court held that, to satisfy the “active efforts” requirement of ICWA, OCS’s
efforts must cross the threshold from passive to active, and a parent’s lack of cooperation
can excuse minor faults on the part of OCS.979
PROPERTY LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Horan v. Kenai Peninsula Borough Board of Equalization
In Horan v. Kenai Peninsula Borough Board of Equalization,980 the supreme court held
that a Board of Equalization could consider rental restrictions when valuing low-income
housing complexes for the purpose of assessing property taxes.981 Park Place owned an
apartment complex built in 2004 that participated in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) program; the complex was valued by an independent appraiser at $652,000
using an income approach.982 The Borough Assessor valued the complex at $2,930,700
using a cost approach.983 Pacific Park appealed the Assessor’s valuation; the Board
determined that although the Assessor had discretion to use the cost approach, rental
restrictions should have been considered.984 In the supreme court, the Assessor argued
that after AS 29.45.110(d) (which mandated an income-approach valuation for complexes
qualifying for the LIHTC program before January 2001) became effective, rental
restrictions could not be considered in the valuation of properties that qualified for the
LIHTC program after January 2001.985 The supreme court disagreed, stating that a taxing
authority is not prohibited from considering rental restrictions just because it is not
required to use an income approach to property valuation.986 Thus, the supreme court
determined, it was reasonable for the Board to consider the rental restrictions on Pacific
Park’s apartment complex in its valuation.987 Affirming, the supreme court held that a
Board of Equalization could consider rental restrictions when valuing low-income
housing complexes for the purpose of assessing property taxes.988
Varilek v. Burke
In Varilek v. Burke,989 the supreme court held that a Board of Equalization is not required
to use a previous valuation of property as the starting point for determining the property’s
977
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current valuation.990 In 2006, the Board of Equalization assessed the value of Varilek’s
property at $85,000.991 Two years later, its value was reassessed at $146,200.992 Varilek
appealed the reassessment; the lower court held that Varilek had not shown that the
property had been improperly valued. 993 On appeal, Varilek argued that the Board should
have considered the 2006 tax assessment as the base rate when it valued the property in
2008 and that the Board should have been required to explain the difference between the
assessments.994 The supreme court reasoned that property assessments are based on
current market values, not previously assessed values; Varilek thus had the burden of
proving that the 2008 assessment was incorrect.995 The supreme court held that a Board
of Equalization is not required to use a previous valuation of property as the starting point
for determining the property’s current valuation.996
Stevens v. Stevens
In Stevens v. Stevens,997 the supreme court held that it is an abuse of discretion to divide
marital property according to its value at a time before the final property division if the
property’s value has changed significantly in the interim.998 Mr. and Mrs. Stevens
separated in 2006 and their divorce proceedings went to trial in June 2007.999 After the
first day of trial, the two parties believed they had reached a settlement agreement.1000
But the two were unable to memorialize the terms of the agreement and their case went
back to trial in August 2008.1001 After the new trial, the superior court divided the marital
assets based on their value as of the first trial date in 2007.1002 The supreme court noted
that, with a few exceptions, property should be divided according to its value close to the
time that the court actually divides the property.1003 Moreover, the court reasoned that it
would be inequitable to divide their property according to its value at the earlier date
because the value of their assets had changed by more than 15 percent during the year
that separated the two trials.1004 Reversing, the supreme court held that it is an abuse of
discretion to divide marital property by its value at a time before the final property
division if the property’s value has changed significantly in the interim.1005
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Burts v. Burts
In Burts v. Burts,1006 the supreme court held that federal law does not preempt the states
from treating military health insurance benefits as marital assets to be divided in a
divorce.1007 Leon received TRICARE health insurance as a military retiree.1008 When he
and his wife divorced, the superior court treated his health insurance as a marital asset
and divided its value between the two.1009 Leon appealed, arguing that state courts are
preempted from considering TRICARE in marital property divisions.1010 The supreme
court first noted that field preemption did not apply, because the Former Spouses’
Protection Act permits state courts to treat disposable retired pay as either belonging
solely to the military retiree or to the married couple.1011 The court next reasoned that
conflict preemption did not apply because TRICARE benefits more closely resemble
pension benefits that can be characterized as marital property (such as disposable retired
pay) than those benefits that cannot (such as military disability retired pay). Affirming,
the supreme court held that federal law does not preempt the states from treating military
health insurance benefits as marital assets to be divided in a divorce.1012
Price v. Eastham
In Price v. Eastham,1013 the supreme court held that prescriptive easements are limited to
those users who have satisfied the elements of the prescriptive easement statute and does
not extend to other types of users.1014 Price owned land that was used by snowmachiners,
for whom a public prescriptive easement over the land was established.1015 In defining the
scope of the easement, the superior court held that other uses, such as hiking, dogsledding, and hunting, should be included in the easement.1016 The supreme court
reasoned that a prescriptive easement is limited to only those users and those uses that
satisfy the elements of the prescriptive easement.1017 Because the superior court had not
explicitly found that non-snowmachine users had satisfied the elements of a prescriptive
easement, they could not be included in the easement.1018 Reversing, the supreme court
held that prescriptive easements are limited to those users who have satisfied the
elements of the prescriptive easement statute and does not extend to other types of
users.1019
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Gillis v. Aleutians East Borough
In Gillis v. Aleutians East Borough,1020 the supreme court held that, to qualify for a
purchase preference under the Alaska Land Act, a lessee must enter the land while it is
under federal control.1021 In 1989, Gillis leased five acres of state land from the Alaska
Department of Natural Resources (DNR).1022 DNR then conveyed the land and lease
interest to Aleutians East Borough.1023 Gillis offered to buy the land from the Borough;
when the Borough refused, he asserted a right to purchase the land under the Alaska Land
Act.1024 The superior court granted summary judgment to the Borough.1025 On appeal, the
supreme court reasoned that the Alaska Land Act’s plain language requires an individual
to enter the land while it is still under federal ownership to qualify for a purchase
preference.1026 Although the statute gives some government land users a right to purchase
leased land without competitive bidding, to qualify the user must begin use of the land
while it is under federal ownership.1027 Affirming, the supreme court held that, to qualify
for a purchase preference under the Alaska Land Act, a lessee must enter the land while it
is under federal control.1028
Shaffer v. Bellows
In Shaffer v. Bellows,1029 the supreme court held that a fixed price repurchase option of
unlimited duration may be an unreasonable restraint on transfers of real property.1030
Shaffer and Bellows purchased an island near Sitka.1031 Shaffer later quitclaimed his
interest in the property in exchange for money and an option agreement that stated he
would have an option to buy the island at a fixed price should Bellows ever sell.1032
When Bellows later gifted the property, Shaffer sued under the agreement.1033 The lower
court held that the option agreement ran with the land and was still viable.1034 On appeal,
the supreme court remanded the case for a determination of whether the option agreement
was unenforceable.1035 The supreme court noted that a fixed price repurchase option of
unlimited duration is an unreasonable restraint on alienation.1036 The court reasoned that
such a restraint would leave owners with an incentive not to sell, even if a potential buyer
would pay more and be willing to put the property to more beneficial use. 1037 Remanding,
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the supreme court held that a fixed price repurchase option of unlimited duration may be
an unreasonable restraint on transfers of real property.1038
Sengul v. CMS Franklin, Inc.
In Sengul v. CMS Franklin, Inc.,1039 the supreme court held that a commercial tenant does
not necessarily waive its right to rent abatement, if the tenant has signed a contract with a
strict non-waiver provision and if the landlord does not suffer prejudice, even if the
tenant fails to pay rent for six weeks and does not discuss rent abatement with its
landlord.1040 CMS entered into a long-term lease for a commercial storefront with
Sengul.1041 The lease included a provision that abated the rent by three to four days for
every day the property was delivered late to lessee.1042 The lease also included a nonwaiver provision, which stated that a failure by either party to insist upon a contractual
right would not constitute waiver of that right.1043 Sengul delivered the property to CMS
a week late because defects in the storefront had to be remedied first.1044 After moving
in, CMS did not pay rent to Sengul and failed to mention rent abatement until six weeks
had passed.1045 The superior court held that CMS had waived its right to abatement
because it had declined to timely invoke the lease’s rent abatement provision.1046 The
supreme court disagreed, first noting the strict non-waiver provision in the contract.1047
The court then noted that CMS could have explicitly or implicitly waived its right to
abatement but that CMS had done neither.1048 CMS could not have impliedly waived its
right to abatement because its failure to raise the issue had not prejudiced Sengul at all—
even if the issue had been raised before CMS moved into the storefront, Sengul could not
have more quickly remedied the defects that pushed back the move-in date.1049
Reversing, the supreme court held that a commercial tenant does not necessarily waive its
right to rent abatement, if the tenant has signed a contract with a strict non-waiver
provision and if the owner does not suffer prejudice, even if the tenant fails to pay rent
for six weeks without discussing rent abatement with its landlord.1050
Henash v. Fairbanks North Star Borough
In Henash v. Fairbanks North Star Borough,1051 the supreme court held that, when a
charitable organization leases property to a charitable organization that uses the property
exclusively for charitable purposes, the revenue remains tax-exempt regardless of the
amount of money earned from the lease.1052 Henash sought tax-exempt status for two
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parcels of land that it had leased to charitable organizations; the borough’s tax assessor
denied the request because Henash had leased the property at market rates. 1053 The
superior court affirmed.1054 On appeal, the supreme court determined that, under
AS 29.45.030 (which governs the tax-exempt status of charitable organizations), the
amount of money received by the lessor is immaterial to determining the tax-exempt
status of the leased property.1055 Because Henash, a charitable organization, had leased
its property to a charitable organization that used the property exclusively for charitable
purposes, the property was tax-exempt under the statute.1056 Reversing, the supreme
court held that, when a charitable organization leases property to a charitable
organization that uses the property exclusively for charitable purposes, the revenue
remains tax-exempt regardless of the amount of money earned from the lease.1057
Cowan v. Yeisley
In Cowan v. Yeisley,1058 the supreme court held that (1) a deeded right of way grants an
easement, not full title, to the recipient1059 and (2) AS 09.10.030, Alaska’s most recent
adverse-possession statute, does not apply retroactively.1060 In 1956, Cowan was deeded
land and a “perpetual right of way running with the land” over a 30-foot strip alongside
the tract.1061 In the years that followed, plots of land around Cowan were conveyed and
subdivided.1062 The subdivision’s plat showed Cowan’s right of way and dedicated it to
the local borough.1063 Cowan sued to determine who controlled the right of way.1064 The
superior court ruled that the original deed had not conveyed the disputed land and, using
the most recent adverse-possession statute, denied Cowan’s adverse-possession claim.1065
The supreme court reasoned that the original deed had not conveyed the disputed strip of
land because the “right of way” language unambiguously granted an easement, not full
title.1066 With respect to the adverse-possession claim, the supreme court noted that no
statute applies retroactively unless the legislature explicitly makes it retroactive.1067
Because Cowan’s potential adverse possession occurred and would have been completed
before the most recent statute was enacted, the most recent statute did not apply.1068 The
supreme court held that (1) a deeded right of way grants an easement, not full title, to the
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recipient1069 and (2) AS 09.10.030, Alaska’s most recent adverse-possession statute, does
not apply retroactively.1070
TORT LAW
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jachetta v. United States, Bureau of Land Management
In Jachetta v. United States, Bureau of Land Management,1071 the Ninth Circuit held that
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) may provide a waiver of federal sovereign
immunity when the alleged torts are also actionable under state law.1072 Jachetta, an
Alaska Native, applied in 1971 to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) for a Native
allotment comprised of two land parcels.1073 Due to an error by BIA, in 1986 the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) issued only the first parcel.1074 Meanwhile, BLM granted
permits to third parties to use the second parcel for the extraction of over 700,000 cubic
yards of gravel, leaving a giant crater on the property.1075 After years of administrative
proceedings, Jachetta finally received the second parcel in 2004.1076 Jachetta sued BLM
and the State for damages and injunctive relief.1077 The district court dimissed Jachetta’s
claims, holding that BLM and the State had sovereign immunity and had not waived
it.1078 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the Eleventh Amendment barred the
entirety of Jachetta’s claims against the State.1079 The court reasoned, however, that the
FTCA provided a waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity for Jachetta’s
nuisance and breach-of-fiduciary-duties claims against BLM because they are actionable
torts under Alaska state law.1080 Reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that the FTCA may
provide a waiver of federal sovereign immunity when the alleged torts are actionable
under state law.1081
Alaska Supreme Court
Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage,1082 the supreme court held that the Workers’
Compensation Act shields a municipality from lawsuits regarding work-related
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injuries.1083 Nelson was injured in a workplace accident and sued the municipality for
damages.1084 The superior court granted summary judgment to the municipality because it
qualified as a “project owner” under AS 23.30.045(a) and, therefore, the Workers’
Compensation Act shielded the municipality from torts arising from work-related
injuries.1085 On appeal, Nelson argued that, under AS 23.30.045, the municipality should
be classified as a “contract-awarding entity” and not as a “project owner.”1086 If the court
accepted his argument, the Workers’ Compensation Act would not shield the
municipality from liability.1087 The supreme court first noted that the statute’s definition
of “project owner” did not preclude the municipality from being characterized as a
project owner.1088 Further, the legislative history strongly suggested that the legislature
had intended to include the State and its political subdivisions in its definition of “project
owner.”1089 Accordingly, the supreme court held that the Workers’ Compensation Act
shields a municipality from lawsuits regarding work-related injuries.1090
Olson v. City of Hooper Bay
In Olson v. City of Hooper Bay,1091 the supreme court held that: (1) internal police
department regulations regarding taser usage can serve as notice that excessive tasing
represents excessive force and (2) the very nature of an officer’s actions may provide
enough notice that his amount of force is excessive.1092 Olson was physically and
verbally combative with officers when they entered his home.1093 The officers tased him
at least 15 times within one minute; some of the tasings occurred while Olson was
handcuffed and lying face-down.1094 The superior court held that the officers were
immune to Olson’s civil lawsuit because Fourth Amendment taser jurisprudence was not
clear enough to provide adequate notice to the officers that multiple tasings constituted
excessive force.1095 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that internal police
department regulations could have provided notice because they established an
unconstested standard for taser usage and because they were not in conflict with federal
guidelines for taser usage.1096 Additionally, the supreme court reasoned that the very
nature of the officers’ actions could have provided notice that they were using excessive
force.1097 The supreme court reversed and held that: (1) internal police department
regulations regarding taser usage can serve as notice that excessive tasing represents
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excessive force and (2) the very nature of an officer’s actions may provide enough notice
that his amount of force is excessive.1098
Russell ex rel. J.N. v. Virg-In
In Russell ex rel. J.N. v. Virg-In,1099 the supreme court held that any reasonable officer
would believe that it is excessive to tase an 11 year-old girl twice after she has committed
a misdemeanor traffic violation and has been compliant in her arrest. 1100 J.N. ran several
stop signs while driving her ATV at 35 m.p.h.1101 Virg-In, a police officer, turned on his
lights and siren and followed J.N.1102 J.N. nearly ran into Virg-In’s car; when she tried to
get away, her ATV stalled.1103 Virg-In approached her, tased her twice, then arrested
her.1104 J.N.’s mother sued Virg-In for excessive use of force.1105 The superior court
granted summary judgment, determining that Virg-In was entitled to qualified immunity
because no clearly-established law would have put him on notice that his conduct was
unlawful and because his conduct was not so extreme that any reasonable officer would
have known it was excessive.1106 On appeal, the supreme court noted that some conduct
can be so egregious that any reasonable officer would know that it is unlawful.1107 The
court reasoned that the use of force is least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants
who are not fleeing, resisting arrest, or posing an immediate threat to an officer’s
safety.1108 Because the superior court had not made any factual findings on these issues, a
remand was necessary.1109 The supreme court held that any reasonable officer would
believe that it is excessive to tase an 11 year-old girl twice after she has committed a
misdemeanor traffic violation and has been compliant in her arrest.1110
TRUSTS & ESTATES LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Foster v. Professional Guardian Services Corp.
In Foster v. Professional Guardian Services Corp.,1111 the supreme court held that, under
the “reasonable compensation” standard of AS 13.26.230, a conservator may not obtain
reimbursement from an estate for attorneys’ fees spent in the unsuccessful defense of
conservator actions that caused significant harm to the estate.1112 The superior court
1098
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appointed a professional conservator for a woman suffering from dementia.1113 Her
daughter sued the conservator and it was found that the conservator had breached its
fiduciary duty to the estate.1114 The conservator incurred large legal fees, paid by the
estate, in defending its actions.1115 The superior court approved reimbursement from the
mother’s property for the full attorneys’ fees the conservator incurred because
AS 13.26.230 permits reasonable compensation from an estate to its lawyers or
conservators.1116 On appeal, the supreme court noted that the paramount interest of
AS 13.26.230 is the protection of the incapacitated person’s estate.1117 The court reasoned
that it would be unreasonable and impermissible under AS 13.26.230 to require a
protected person to fund a conservator’s legal defense of actions that had significantly
damaged the protected person’s estate, even if the defense was undertaken in good
faith.1118 The supreme court held that under the “reasonable compensation” standard of
AS 13.26.230, a conservator may not obtain reimbursement from an estate for attorneys’
fees spent in the unsuccessful defense of conservator actions that caused significant harm
to the estate.1119
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